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Abstract 
 
Following the European sovereign debt crisis and the detrimental consequences this had 
for the European financial markets, Europe found itself at a crossroads, with an uncertain 
future ahead. As the choice was between fragmentation of the Member States or embarking 
on a journey almost as meaningful as a common currency, the 28 Member States decided 
on further integration, thereby establishing joint supervision for the euro area financial 
institutions and granting the ECB exclusive powers in its role as supervisor. The decision 
was supported by a unanimous decision of the European Council which pushed for fast 
action, and within only two years the mechanism began operating. Applying the theories of 
legal pluralism and globalization this research paper evaluates different arguments for and 
against a common banking supervision and tries to establish whether the relevant 
institutions and Member States are in fact ready for this rapid development. Using 
evaluation research as the methodological foundation for the scientific research a 
conclusion was reached based on interviews, media content analysis and statistics, 
providing an answer to the question of whether the mechanism is anachronistic or in fact a 
necessary step for the future of Europe. 
 
Key words: Single Supervisory Mechanism, Banking Union, ECB, Legal Pluralism, 
Globalization 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis, which escalated in 2008, came to have a large effect on 
Europe’s financial stability and lead to a euro area sovereign debt crisis. In order to “create 
a safer and sounder financial sector for the single market”1, the European Union is in the 
process of establishing deeper integration of the banking system through the creation of a 
Banking Union. This consists of two parts - a Single Supervisory Mechanism
2
 (SSM) and 
a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) - both based on a Single Rulebook. SSM will 
operate through the European Central Bank
34
 (ECB) as the central supervisor of financial 
institutions in the euro area. This paper intends to assess the suitability of the SSM, with 
the assessment being focused on the time supervision began and whether or not it is 
anachronistic. 
This introduction will set out to describe some specific problems related to the SSM. 
Consequently these problems will be the focus of the paper. Thereafter, the aim and 
approach used will be explained. Following this, a short description of the significance of 
the problem for the field of sociology of law will be given and, lastly, in a separate 
subsection, the delimitations of the areas which this study will not cover will be outlined.  
The second section of the paper will outline the literary review of the thematic 
background, which has been divided into the two subsections: the financial background 
and the regulatory background. In the subsequent section, the theoretical foundations of 
the research will be explained. The theories which will be applied for the evaluation are 
legal pluralism and globalization. Next the methodological approach of evaluation 
research will be described as well as the different qualitative and quantitative methods of 
gathering relevant data. The findings of the research will be presented in the section called 
results and subsequently processed in the analysis unit. Finally, the conclusion will 
summarize the thesis and give suggestions for further research. 
  
                                                 
1 European Commission. (2014). “Financial Services: Banking Union”. European Commission. 8th of July, 2014. 
2 Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for 
cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent 
authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17)  
3 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
4 Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013amending Regulation 
(EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the 
conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 
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1.1. Problem Description 
Following the crisis and the devastating impact it has had on the European economy, 
society and banking sector, the European Union is taking steps in what they have called 
‘completing’ the European Monetary Union. The apparent novelty of the subject of 
supervision and a banking union was commented on by an author who wrote that the 
subject had “rarely [been] discussed in European policy-making circles prior to 2012”.5 
Another commentator remarks that the topic had previously been reserved “to regulators 
and bankers along with a few parliamentarians, academics and professional naysayers”6 - a 
statement which is supported by the publication of the De Larosière Report in 2009. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a mismatch between the importance of the supervision and 
the shaping of the process without the involvement, opinions and support of different stake 
holders. Regardless of these aspects the idea of a ‘banking union’ was relocated to the front 
page news in 2012
7
 and has since then been considered the sina qua non of a fully 
established EMU.
8
 
Creating a joint supervision leads to significant changes on an institutional level. The 
establishment of the SSM is not only a step towards completing Europe’s monetary union, 
it is also a decision to grant the ECB supervisory powers over the Eurozone banking 
system, marking a significant transfer of power from national to EU level, allowing the 
latter much more autonomy in decisions regarding previously sensitive sovereign functions 
in the banking sector. Transferring supervisory powers to the ECB however comes at a 
certain cost for the institution, as it will be required to separate powers concerning 
monetary policy from power concerning supervisory activities.
9
 In practice this means that 
the ECB will build a complete new division, with staff specifically trained in European 
banking supervision, within a short period of time. The central bank will also be faced with 
challenges concerning the framework, as changes to the final legislation must be passed 
with the consent of Eurozone and non-Eurozone members alike. According to Verhelst, the 
creation of the SSM has made the completion of the Banking Union indispensable as its 
                                                 
5Howarth, David & Lucia Quaglia. (2013). Banking Union as Holy Grail: Rebuilding the Single Market in Financial 
Services, Stabilizing Europe’s Banks and ‘Completing’ Economic and Monetary Union. Journal of Common Market 
Studies. Vol. 51: 103. 
6Germain, Randall. (2012). Governing global finance and banking. Review of International Political Economy. Vol. 
19(4): 530. 
7Germain 2012: 530 
8Howarthet. al. 2013: 103 
9Gheorghe, Carmen Adriana. ( 2013). Single Banking Supervision and the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Bulletin of the 
Transilvania University of Brasov. Vol. 6(55). No. 1 Series V: Economic Sciences: 224 
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importance creates a “point of no return for the Banking Union.”10 The problem which 
therefore remains is whether or not the EU Institutions as well as the Member States are in 
fact ready for this giant leap of faith. 
As regards the Eurozone Member States which will be supervised by the ECB, certain 
issues have become evident in the aftermath of the crisis. While it clearly demonstrated a 
prevalent need for better cross-border supervision and a reduction in national biases, it also 
showed how some Member States pocketed the loss of their banks out of fear of putting 
national financial institutions at a monetary disadvantage in the pan-European context of 
market integration and competition.
11
 This toxic relation is supposed to be targeted by the 
SSM, which aims to “break the vicious link between sovereigns and their banks.”1213 In 
order to avoid the financial stability of Member States on the whole to be threatened
14
 the 
mechanism will try to make sure that the losses of banks no longer become the debt of 
Europe’s citizens. Even if the Member States have taken a large step in transferring powers 
to a supranational institution, fears that national supervisions have been and will continue 
not to face up to the scale of banking sectors misconducts prevail. This anxiety has been an 
argument for the creation of a European supervisor
15
 but it seems almost naïve to expect 
the Member States to have made a radical change towards transparency and EU 
cooperation within only two years. 
This timely issue could mean that the relevant EU institutions and the Eurozone Member 
States are not sufficiently prepared to move into this new phase of EU integration and 
instead more time would have been necessary to establish a sound framework. To many 
the speed at which the transfer took place may be regarded as somewhat hasty, especially 
when considering the complexities involved in establishing a supranational functioning 
supervision, let alone doing so between politically sovereign Member States. Gheorghe 
remarks that the current reform has been constructed around the single attribute 
‘promptitude’16, showing that perhaps not enough time has been granted to a carefully 
designed SSM framework. In this regard Verhelst also highlights that a cautiously crafted 
                                                 
10Verhelst, Stijn. (2013). Assessing the Single Supervisory Mechanism: Passing the Point of No Return for Europe’s 
Banking Union. Paper 58. Brussels, Belgium: Egmont –The Royal Institute for International Relations: 9 
11Véron, Nicolas & Guntram B. Wolf (2013). From Supervision to Resolution: Next Steps on the road to European 
Banking Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution. Issue 2013 (4). February 2013: 6 
12Verhelst 2013: 9 
13 José-Manuel Barroso said in Press Release. European Commission. (2012). Commission proposes new ECB powers 
for banking supervision as part of a banking union. European Commission. 12th of September 2012. 
14 European Commission 2012 
15Verhelst 2013: 12 
16 Gheorghe 2013: 224 
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design “is of essential importance”17, hinting that the consequences of a malfunctioning 
framework could have negative externalities on the Union. Meanwhile skepticism prevails 
regarding whether or not increased integration through enhanced regulation can indeed be 
successful. It questions if the rapidity of the implementation allows for fundamental 
sovereign values to be considered
18
 and apprehensions about whether or not Europe is in 
fact ready for a Eurozone-wide regulation and supervision. 
Despite the intentions presented by the EU in favor of a joint European supervisor being 
mainly positive, the risks it entails should not be underestimated. A clear lack of 
transparency, both with regard to EU institutions as well as Eurozone Member States, 
makes it difficult to only see the positives. Beyond this, a supranational supervision 
presents a unique economic, political and even social experiment which has been 
unprecedented and where the outcome is far from certain. Currently it seems as though 
European supervision “is clearly linked to the ongoing crisis”19, rather than convincingly 
proving to be crafted from a deeper-rooted European-wide need for supervision. In order to 
assess these issues, the main research problem which will be explored is: Is the European 
Banking Union and entailed Banking Supervision anachronistic? The aim and approach 
for this evaluation will be considered in the subsequent section. 
1.2.  Aim, Hypothesis and Approach 
As mentioned above, this research paper sets out to explore if the European supervision of 
the Eurozone banking systems is anachronistic. In other words, whether the establishment 
of the SSM and the EBU is taking place at the optimal time or should have been created 
either at an earlier or a later stage. This will be established by determining if the relevant 
European institutions and the Eurozone Member States are ready to take on the 
responsibility and respectively delegate powers to a supranational institution. Following 
this the time issue will be considered, challenging the idea that two years was enough time 
to implement the mechanism. Thereby the aim is to critically evaluate the situation of the 
ECB and the Member States since the outbreak of the financial crisis and their subsequent 
behavior as regards achieving the best possible results for the European Union. This will 
be done by individually addressing the three sub-questions:  
                                                 
17Verhelst 2013: 12 
18As can be seen by Germanys attempt to challenge the banking union in its constitutional court, in which five academics 
“filed a case claiming that the EU’s banking union is illegal under German law because it was created without the 
necessary treaty changes.” Wagstyl, Stefan. (2014). EU Banking Union challenged. Financial Times. February 7th 2014. 
19Verhelst 2013: 11 
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 Are the European Union institutions20 ready for a European Banking Supervisor? 
 Are the European Member States21 ready for a European Banking Supervisor? 
 Would more time22 have been necessary to establish a successful supervision? 
At the outset, the authors’ hypothesis questioning whether two years of preparation time 
was sufficient for allowing for the necessary quality was skeptical; whether the EU 
institutions are sufficiently prepared for the task which has been transferred to them from 
sovereigns and if in reality the sovereigns are ready to, not only give up power on paper, 
but to actually transfer powers to a supranational level and to act in accordance with this. 
In other words, the author from the outset questioned the creation of the Banking 
Supervision as a Regulation misplaced in time – too early or too late, i.e. anachronistic. 
The approach to the assessment is the execution of evaluation research based on the 
theoretical foundations of legal pluralism and globalization. The method of evaluation 
research allows for qualitative and quantitative data collection which is aimed at providing 
a comprehensive analysis of the current situation. The collected data will give an insightful 
answer to the research and sub-questions. In terms of qualitative data collection, interviews 
were executed with people from relevant institutions; a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative research was done by analyzing media content; and finally with regard to the 
quantitative data collection, relevant statistics were produced using information provided 
by the national and supranational institutions. 
1.3. Socio-legal Significance 
In socio-legal literature lawyers have sometimes been criticized for seeing international 
law only as a response to crisis rather than “issues of structural justice that underpin 
everyday life.”23 Supervision and the SSM have also primarily been seen as clearly linked 
to the ongoing crisis
24
, meaning that it is simply a tool created to fill the holes exposed by 
the crisis and not, as stated by the EU, the necessary step towards completing the EMU. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that the transfer of competencies to a supranational level 
was only the result of a crisis and not in fact a genuine dedication towards integration. 
While this historically has been cause for integration, this argument in itself does not 
legitimize the legislative power transfer and one has to look closely at the Supervisory 
Mechanisms to assess its validity. 
                                                 
20 Primarily the ECB will be considered, but the Treaty and the EP will also be considered 
21 National Central Banks and National Supervisors 
22 Than the two years since the agreement to establish the SSM 
23Cotterrell, Roger. (2006). Comparative Law and Legal Culture. In: Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.: 4 
24Verhelst 2013: 11 
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Barker writes that “persuading Eurozone countries to give up national control over their 
banking systems” was something that “the EU’s single currency club did not think 
realistic.”25 Nevertheless, seeing the Banking Union and Supervision merely as a product 
of the crisis may not reveal the whole picture. Thus, applying the theories of legal 
pluralism and globalization to assess the research question will allow a broader assessment 
of what brought the SSM into being and provide a link to sociology of law, thereby 
establishing whether the SSM and the banking union are in fact anachronistic 
Applying the theory of legal pluralism on the topic of banking supervision calls into 
question some fundamental aspects. Although the decision for a joint supervision was 
taken by a unanimous vote, legal pluralism questions if harmonization is in fact a suitable 
tool for governing hybrid legal spaces. As regards the establishment of the mechanism, the 
theory advocates the creation of mechanisms which manage via legal pluralism without 
eliminating it. Considering that legal pluralism encourages the incorporation of various 
opinions and voices of those concerned and affected by a piece of legislation, differences 
in opinion regarding a joint supervision and the feeling of not-being-heard could possibly 
jeopardize the supervision. This would mean that an incorporation and recognition of a 
variety of normative systems would be a necessary prerequisite for the functioning of the 
SSM. 
In regard to the globalization theory the notion of the sovereign state is continuously being 
challenged in the context of internationalization of economic activity. The theory suggests 
that states have become impotent vis-à-vis global economy and that they have lost their 
exclusive jurisdiction over their territory. This would mean that Member States depend on 
a strong institution to protect them from outside risk. However, if countries continue to put 
national interests before European-wide interests, they risk a sound functioning of the 
mechanism, which would endanger not only supervision but also financial stability. This 
brings forward the importance of networking between the national and supranational 
levels, as the mechanism “will require a good working relationship between the national 
supervisors and the ECB.”26 This calls for heightened sensitivity, which is necessary as 
regards the interferences of the ECB with the work of the NCAs. If this is not considered 
carefully and it is “not properly managed, its decentralized functioning could prove to be 
the SSM’s weak spot.”27 
                                                 
25Barker, Alex. (2014). European banking union: Foundations laid but bricks still to fall in place. Financial Times. Future 
of the European Union. May 8, 2014. 
26Verhelst 2013: 20 
27Verhelst 2013: 20 
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1.4. Delimitations of the Study 
As can be seen, the European Banking Union consists of different components, which in 
itself leads to manifold problems. This paper sets out to focus on the supervisory tasks 
granted to and operated by the ECB instead of laying its focus on a different matter, as this 
research paper does not provide for a more extensive research. Moreover, while financially 
and economically it would be relevant to consider the need for legislation to counter 
further fragmentation of the European financial services markets as well as considerations 
regarding the possibility of a regulation restricting operations in the financial sector, these 
aspects will not be considered here. This is because such studies would move too far into 
the field of economics, which is a different subject matter. 
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2. Thematic background: A Literary Review 
This chapter examines the thematic background for banking supervision, encompassing the 
historical evolution which paved the way for a joint supervision in the form of SSM, which 
will start operating in November of this year. In doing so, it gives a portrayal of previous 
scientific publications in the form of statistical/financial data (quantitative sources) and the 
major literary publications (qualitative data). Due to its technicality and novelty, the topic 
has not yet been analyzed from a socio-legal perspective. The literature gives insight into 
expressed concerns and criticisms as well as opportunities related to the current 
construction of a European Banking Union, based on the financial implications of the crisis 
and previous legislative considerations. 
2.1. Financial Background 
The results of the financial crisis have been damaging, not only have the intra-national 
economies of EU Member States been severely affected, but also the transnational social 
and economic relations have suffered. Even if state centered solutions may have been 
successful just a few decades ago, the current interconnectedness of markets, the 
establishment of the EMU and the existence of a common currency have made a common 
approach with regard to the Single Market, EMU and a possible EBU, indispensable. A 
common approach has thus been advocated by the economist Verhelst,
28
 an attitude shared 
by the ECB and the Commission. In 2012 almost half of the annual report of the ECB was 
concerned with the effects and benefits of financial integration as well as highlighting the 
“deleterious effects of disintegration on monetary union and the effectiveness of monetary 
policy.”29 The crisis came to influence the financial services market of Europe and led to a 
subsequent wave of fragmentation that spread across the continent, which in turn affected 
the ECB’s ability to operate effective monetary policy. In the words of Nicolas Véron30, a 
French economist, writing on the necessity of common action to counter the crisis: “In 
Europe too, united we stand or divided we fall.” 31 
The degree to which countries had been economically integrated pre-crisis impetus had 
clearly not been advanced enough “to prevent renationalization of credit conditions, even 
though the effect has been muted by the European Central Bank’s exceptional liquidity 
                                                 
28 Verhelst 2013: 14 
29 Howarth et. Al. 2013: 104 
30 Véron is a French economist and Expert on Financial Crisis 
31 Véron, Nicolas. (2011). Stress tests fail to rescue Europe’s banks. Financial Times: Opinion. July 14, 2011. 
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provisions.”32 Despite efforts by the central bank, the crisis immediately brought about less 
integration of banking markets. Factors which had previously been indicators for a high 
level of market integration began decreasing, evidenced by a fall in the establishment and 
activity of assets held by foreign branches and subsidiaries and a decline in cross-border 
merger and acquisition activities of banks.
33
 The Member States deliberately sought 
different approaches to counter the crisis. For example, Member States set different levels 
of depositor protection - ranging from €20,000 in many new Member States and the UK to 
more than €100,000 in Italy and France34 - causing discrepancies in the level of trust 
towards banks. In an attempt to regulate deposit guarantees, some countries, e.g. Ireland 
and Germany, took further uncoordinated decisions, thereby worsening the crisis. Such 
nationalistic behavior distorted the “level playing field competition and created the 
potential for bank runs”35 as consumers in some Member States were inclined to shift 
deposits to countries with more generous guarantee schemes. 
On the other hand, some authors would argue that it was precisely the closer 
interconnectedness between profoundly different sovereigns that brought about some of the 
consequences seen in the crisis. Rather than the reckless indebtedness of a few countries as 
the cause for the European sovereign debt crisis, Scharpf argues that difficulties arose with 
the decision to establish an EMU between ‘economically, socially, institutionally and in its 
political preferences heterogenic Member States.’36 He argues that Member States 
renounced their macroeconomic instruments in favor of a ECB ‘one-size-fits all’ policy, 
with the result that countries with a below average growth and inflation rate went into 
recession (e.g. Germany in the early 2000s) and countries with high inflation rates (e.g. 
‘PIIGS countries37’) lending at extremely low real interest rates.38 Domestic demand for 
loan financing was escalated visibly by the real estate bubble in Ireland and Spain, leading 
to an increase in wages and imports. Scharpf finally states that this led to an ever growing 
account deficit which was automatically financed under the EMU, through surplus 
countries without resulting in a balance of payments deficit.
39
 
                                                 
32 Véron 2011 
33 Howarth et. Al. 2013: 105 
34 Howarth et. Al. 2013: 107 
35 Howarth et. Al. 2013: 107 
36 Scharpf, Fritz Wilhelm. (2012). ‘Soziales Europa: Bestandsaufnahme - Erosion der Legitimation in der Europäischen 
Union durch eine soziale Krise?’. Soziales Europa unter den Bedingungen der Krise. Düsseldorf, 21 August 2012. 
37 Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain 
38 Scharpf 2012 
39 Scharpf 2012 
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On a domestic level, as a result of the economic turmoil, a number of enterprises went 
bankrupt, investors experienced financial losses
40
 and harsh austerity measures were 
imposed. The situation was made even more difficult by “government spending cuts, 
output, and income caus[ing] unemployment to increase, tax revenues to fall, and 
sovereign deficits and debt to rise, triggering more financial stress, and so on in a 
downward spiral.”41 As some banks were perceived to have a deteriorating solvability, this 
soon came to influence the solvency of entire countries, leading to higher public borrowing 
costs for these Member States and consequently for banks.
42
 Elliott writes that this cycle 
can be sparked by national bank runs, as citizens fear default of national debt or even 
withdrawal from the euro, and start moving their funds outside their county. The 
repercussions this has on the banks can be a compromised solvency and “it has forced 
many of them to rely on the ECB for liquidity life support, which does not reassure anyone 
about the long-term ability of these banks to survive.”43 Many governments used public 
money to support and save banks and to “eliminate assets that are difficult to evaluate from 
balances.”44 A negative spiral developed as domestic banks came to hold an increasing 
amount of sovereign debt, while simultaneously being bailed out to avoid systemic risk.
 45
 
Finally, in an unprecedented effort to avoid the collapse of the banking system and 
simultaneous bankruptcy of entire nation states, the EU and the IMF stepped in to provide 
financial assistance.
46
 This action was taken despite the ECB continuously denying being 
the ‘lender of last resort’ as well as their initial reluctance to bail out banks and Member 
States. As the crisis expanded and some countries came to suffer more severely than 
others, it became clear that Member States could not be left to their own devices without 
risking destabilizing the entire European financial structure. Therefore the only solution 
was a collective approach. 
The consequences of the crisis have been detrimental to both intranational economies of 
the EU and to transnational social and economic relations. Financial implications range 
from a slow rate of global macroeconomic recovery, financial markets still not functioning 
normally,
47
 a total of €4.5 trillion in taxpayers money and state guarantees having been 
                                                 
40 Gheorghe 2013: 223 
41 Semmler, Will. (2013). The Macroeconomics of Austerity in the European Union. Social Research. Vol. 80(3). Fall 
2013: 883 
42 Verhelst 2013: 11 
43 Elliott, Douglas J. (2012). Key Issues on European Banking Union: Trade-Offs and some Recommendations. 
Brookings, Global Economy and & Development. Working Paper 52: 7. 
44 Gheorghe 2013: 223 
45Howarthet. Al. 2013: 106 
46 Gheorge 2013: 223 
47 Gheorghe 2013: 223 
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committed to support and guarantee EU ailing banks
48
. Before the outbreak of the crisis the 
level of cross-border inter-bank loans in the EU had peaked at a level of 45% in 2007. 
Cross-border bank holdings of the Eurozone’s monetary financial institutions, for example 
in terms of government and corporate bonds held by monetary financial institutions, had 
been at a high of over 40%.
49
 As these figures began to drop following the 2008 outbreak 
of the crisis, the result was a brutal demonstration of how devastating “the impact of the 
international financial crisis and then the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis [had been] on the 
single market in financial services.”50 The crisis did not only negatively impact the level of 
integration of financial and bank markets, but it exposed the existence of nation-centered 
interests and the heterogeneous situations they were in. While the problems were global, 
the effects and ability to act remained mainly national, despite European solutions being 
necessary. 
2.2. Regulatory Background 
The sovereign debt crisis “laid bare structural weaknesses in the EU’s policy 
framework”.51 These were to be countered by the establishment of a new framework of 
international supervision, taking into account the European and global dimensions of the 
crisis.
52
 Previous regulations had already existed before the outbreak of the financial crisis, 
but as Germain argues, the notorious Basel Regulations, for example, worked in favor of 
and “could not but be the creation of the biggest banks, given their information rich 
position in the global financial system and their extensive ties to key national regulatory 
communities.”53 In an attempt to counter the link between “the banking and sovereign debt 
crises”54 the EU sought solutions which would offer a European response to the financial 
crisis, thereby deciding to finally break the “vicious link between sovereigns and their 
banks.”55  
Also the form of legislation has become more efficient. While previously the Basel 
Regulations
56
 and other financial legislation had taken the form of directives, these had the 
disadvantage that their operation was dependent on their implementation by Member 
                                                 
48 Zavvos, G.S. (2013). "Towards a European Banking Union: Legal and Policy Implications." 22 Nd Annual Hyman P. 
Minsky Conference. Evy Economics Institute Bard College, New York. 18th of April 2013. Levy Institute.: 4 
49 Howarth et. Al. 2013: 105 
50 Howarth et. Al. 2013: 105 
51 Verhelst 2013: 9 
52 De Larosière, Jacques, Leszek Balcerowicz, Otmar Issing, Rainer Masera, Callum Mc Carthy, Lars Nyberg, José Pérez, 
& Onno Ruding. (2009). The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU. Rep. Brussels: European Union.  
53 Germain 2012: 533 
54 Verhelst 2013: 9 
55 See Introduction 
56 Capital Requirement Directive (CRD) Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 
2006 
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States. As these leave “open the possibility of national options or ‘specificities’ in the 
implementation of EU rules”, subsequent legislation includes a mix of directives as well as 
regulations which need to be adopted by the Member States in order to be implemented. 
As directives contain a number of national discretions, leaving “open the possibility of 
national options or ‘specificities’ in the implementation of EU rules”, the subsequent 
legislation passed following the crisis included a directive as well as a regulation.
57
 While 
supervision of the financial sector has traditionally been a national competence with 
limited cross-border effects, the change of legislative form indicates an attempt to achieve 
a maximum level of harmonization for a more unified supervision in future. 
To many the introduction of a banking union and common supervision seemed to come as 
a surprise. A closer look, however, reveals that the idea was on the table long before the 
public announcement of the decision in mid-2012. This can be taken from a report written 
for the Commission by De Larosière in 2009, making initial proposals for a common 
supervision. The move of the topic “from a public backwater (…) to the status of the front 
news”58 is justified by Bradley as being the result of connections between domestic 
regulators becoming increasingly significant.
59
 Additionally it had also to be reformulated 
in a manner that would more adequately and securely anchor financial governance on an 
international scale.”60 As the Eurozone sought for an answer on how to counter the crisis 
that seemed to worsen by the minute, the solution of a new supervisory mechanism was 
tinkered on a solution which intended to shift the major part of supervisory responsibilities 
to a European level. 
The three-year gap between the De Larosière Report and the announcement of an 
agreement can most likely be traced back to intense intergovernmental negotiations. 
Discrepancies in the affiliation towards regulatory measures prevented rasher action. While 
having strong support from France, Italy and Spain as well as the Commission from the 
beginning, Germany remained reluctant and raised several objections. Debates on a 
common supervision and banking union “paralleled long-standing debates on Eurozone 
governance and solutions to the sovereign debt crisis” as the European ministers initially 
“failed to overcome major ongoing obstacles.”61 Germany and other northern countries 
were primary concerned by the prospect of being forced into contributing more funds into 
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the ESM to bail out banks in other countries, now slightly dampened by the decision that 
the ESM funds will only be used under the supervision of the ECB within the realms of the 
new banking union.
62
 As a consequence of these long-standing negotiations, supervision 
will be put into place approximately two years later than envisaged by France or the 
Commission. Nevertheless, the establishment of a Banking Union marks a major transfer 
of national competencies to European level. 
The new supervisory mechanism which will start operating in November of this year 
“amount[s] to a radical initiative to stabilize the EU`s national banking systems [which 
have been] exposed directly to the sovereign debt crisis.”63 Founded on a single rule book, 
this intends to harmonize all legislation in this field, consistently on a euro area level.
64
 
Another important institutional consideration discussed to whom to grant the supervisory 
role: the final choice to designate the ECB was heavily influenced by institutional and legal 
considerations.
65
 The report of De Larosière and his expert team recommended that the 
ECB and the European System of Central Banks be explicitly and formally charged with 
responsibility
66
, as an agency would not have the necessary discretionary powers essential 
for supervision.
67
 The report further suggests that the competencies which are currently 
found at national level should be transferred to the ECB, including the ability to “license 
the institutions concerned, enforce capital requirements, [and] carry out on-site 
inspections.”68 Even though the ECB will be the institution to exert final control, 69 certain 
aspects of the supervision will remain the responsibility of NCAs.  
The final supervision mechanism undertakes a more nuanced division of competencies and 
many responsibilities have been left at a national level. This can be seen as grounded by 
the sensitive nature of banking supervision and a reluctance on the part of the sovereigns to 
transfer too much power to a supranational level. The idea of granting NCAs certain 
competencies was already proposed in the De Larosière Report, suggesting that the 
supranational supervisor should collaborate with already existing national financial 
supervisory authorities
70
, while at the same time “leaving a substantial part of the 
supervisory tasks at the national level”.71 Verhelst acknowledges that it is an immense step 
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forward in addressing Europe’s interconnected crisis, but warns that there are certain 
limitations with regard to the relationship between the supranational supervisor and NCAs. 
Highlighting the importance of an “effective working relationship between the ECB and 
the national supervisors”, he remarks that this could otherwise turn out to be “the weak link 
in the Banking Union.”72 As intransparency, insincerity and difficulties in terms of 
negotiations have shown since the outbreak of the crisis, this could prove to be a difficult 
task for the ECB to master and concerns should not be disregarded. 
The absence of “a central EU body responsible for financial crisis management and the 
lack of a common resolution and deposit insurance scheme”73 continues to cast doubt over 
the ability of the Eurozone to effectively handle crisis management and resolution. The 
issue with establishing a crisis management body is the controversy it entails: a European 
financial crisis with decision-making powers having fiscal implications.
74
 A possible fiscal 
union is highly controversial and the Swedish Finance Minister Anders Borg warns that the 
EU should be more hesitant talking about a fiscal union as “they might create something 
that solves very little, but undermines the whole fundamental structure of the European 
Union.”75 This aspect calls into question whether or not the institutions of the EU are in 
fact ready to take on the role of supervisors of the Eurozone banking sector, or whether a 
more solid structural foundation would indeed be required. While some policy-makers 
advocated a further enlargement of the banking union through the incorporation of an even 
larger part of the financial sector, it has been decided that the banking sector should be 
defined in narrow terms. This could lead to odd situations, such as in France when “the 
insurance arm of financial institutions [will be] supervised at the national level, while the 
banking arm of the same institutions will be supervised as part of the SSM.”76 This means 
that the different supervisory levels will need to cooperate closely for these issues not to 
become severe problems. All the while emphasizing the advantages of the SSM, Verhelst 
remains skeptical as regards the feasibility of the banking union. In his view it is both 
overly ambitious (as he believes that the deadlines will not be met) and incomplete 
(arguing that the fare of a common deposit guarantee remains unsure).
77
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3. Theoretical foundation 
The theoretical foundation of the thesis will be based on the concepts of Legal Pluralism 
and Globalization. Both theories recognize the “irreducible plurality of legal orders in the 
world, the coexistence of domestic state law with other legal orders [and] the absence of a 
hierarchically superior position transcending the differences.”78 All of these aspects can be 
considered relevant when assessing the institution and legislation making procedures of 
establishing a common banking supervisor. In order to explain the different interest groups 
which prevail, not only in the EU in general, but in the creation of the EBU and the SSM in 
particular, the theory of legal pluralism will first be used to express the hybrid legal spaces 
that prevail in the EU. The second theoretical approach is the globalization theory, which 
will explain the modern development of legislation making and put it into a global context. 
The theories will first be defined and their origin will be considered. After this the aspects 
which are relevant to this study will be outlined. 
3.1. Legal Pluralism 
The notion of legal pluralism has been a long way coming, as an ideology of legal 
centralism has previously frustrated development of general theory and been considered a 
hindrance to accurate observations.
79
 The definition which will be used for legal pluralism, 
stems from Michaels who defines it as “describing a situation in which two or more laws 
(or legal systems) coexist in (or are obeyed by) one social field (or a population or an 
individual).”80 Within this study the social field will encompass features such as (amongst 
others) nationality and geography
81
 while maintaining that the EU undoubtedly 
encompasses many more features. As several scholars independently of one another 
rediscovered that “society is plural rather than monolithic, that it is private as well as 
public in character and that the national (public, official) legal system is often a secondary 
rather than a primary locus of regulation”82 the former focus on centralism became 
outdated. In regard to the subject matter, this theory is relevant as it displays a 
supranational institution operating at a transnational level to encompass the legal, cultural 
and political variations of all Eurozone countries. 
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When looking at the concept of legal pluralism, it should first be acknowledged that it 
developed in the 1970s and 1980s within legal anthropology and sociology in order to 
analyze “overlapping normative orders within societies”.83 Especially prominent in the 
development of the theory in regard to socio-legal studies was John Griffith who in 1986 
proclaimed that legal pluralism is fact while legal centralism is “a myth, an ideal, a claim, 
an illusion.”84 In the early 1990s it became evident “that a single-minded focus on state-to-
state relations or universal overarching norms was inadequate to describe the reality of the 
emerging global legal system”85, making room for the theory of legal pluralism. While 
legal rules had traditionally been tied to a specific territory, it became increasingly 
important in the modern world to recognize that physical location alone could no longer be 
seen as the sole criterions necessary for legal authority and that nation states “must work 
within a framework of multiple overlapping jurisdictional assertions by state, international, 
and even non state communities.86 These overlapping jurisdictional assertions prevail in a 
society as multifaceted as the EU, and while at some level economic practice and 
legislation can be harmonized, it should not be ignored that there is always a social aspect 
to legislation making and implementation. 
From an analytical point of view, the theory of legal pluralism offers a useful alternative to 
the traditional framework of centralism, as it recognizes and identifies the existence of 
hybrid legal spaces. These hybrid legal spaces can be defined as normative systems which 
occupy the same social field and are thus forced to negotiate these hybrid legal spaces.
87
 
The theory and practice of legal pluralism recognizes the existence of such spaces, and can 
thereby be justified as a technique of governance on pragmatic grounds.
88
 Attempts to 
govern hybrid legal spaces have been seen in an increasing call for “harmonization of 
norms, more treaties, the construction of international governing bodies and the creation of 
‘world law’”89 approaches which do not seem to consider a possible embrace of legal 
pluralism. Berman suggests the development of procedural mechanisms, institutions and 
practices which could instead govern while using legal pluralism and without eliminating 
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it.
90
 This solution sounds more like the European motto in varietate concordia
91
 than a 
forced compliance under one normative system. 
This research paper sets out to study the applicability of a legal pluralism approach to a 
number of state and non-state normative systems, encompassed in the creation of joint 
supervision. The theory of cosmopolitan pluralism will give guidance to the research, as 
the approach dictates that there is not a single answer on who decides, nor that there is an 
authoritative metric for determining which norms should prevail in a messy hybrid world.
92
 
Instead the theory suggests that by applying a cosmopolitan approach, society is provided 
with a legislation making model which focuses on creative interventions made by various 
communities drawing on an assortment of normative sources in political, rhetorical and 
legal iterations.
93
 The proposed framework does not advocate for an undifferentiated 
inclusion of communities, but it rather suggests that, by expanding the range of voices 
heard, more opportunities can be created in order to forge a common social space. Unlike 
attitudes from sovereign and universal approaches, which limit the range of norms which 
are considered and where normative assertions of multiple entities compete for primary, 
the cosmopolitan approach would enable law to benefit from inclusion, diversity, creativity 
and dialogue.
94
 Although the supervision has already been established, it would be 
important to evaluate whether a legal pluralist approach or whether centralism dictated the 
formulation of the legislation. 
Although the attention of legal pluralism has traditionally been focused on clashes within 
one geographical area under a single sovereign authority, the fact that the countries of the 
Eurozone partially represent a geographical area makes it relevant for its study. If we apply 
the theory to the EBU and the supervision, we are only able to fully understand the 
meaning, if it is recognized that the legislation originates from and has an impact on “many 
local settings in which the norms of multiple communities – geographical, ethnic, national 
and epistemic – become operative.”95 The study will focus on the overlapping 
jurisdictional assertions which have created hybrid legal spaces in the global arena.
96
 It 
also presents the link between legal pluralism and the theory of globalization. Especially in 
regards to global or European governance, it is important to recognize the pluralist nature 
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of law, and the fact that it is “accountable to a variety of relatively independent actors: 
domestic courts, international civil society, and competing international regimes.”97 This 
idea is also put forward by Cotterrell who remarks that, for some, harmonization may not 
be beneficial but that it rather represents an ignorance of the varied historic past and 
culture, as well as customs and potentialities, which can be considered a moral and 
political affront.
98
 Considering the diversity of the Eurozone landscape it is important to 
recognize the diversity, which should in turn be reflected in the appropriate legislations. 
3.2. Globalization Theory 
Globalization theory can be seen as directly linked to legal pluralism, as “many of the 
challenges that globalization poses to traditional legal thought closely resemble those 
formulated earlier by legal pluralists.”99 The ongoing globalization process has challenged 
our view of the sovereign, thereby transforming its traditional conception and construction 
– a necessary step considering the internationalization of economic and social activity.100 
In order to meet the three criteria which Therborn considers necessary for social theory and 
analysis (precise meaning, usable in empirical investigation and wide variety of possible 
applications) the definition which will be used, defines globalization as “tendencies to a 
worldwide reach, impact, or connectedness of social phenomenon or to a world-
encompassing awareness among social actors.”101 This definition can be applied to the EU 
and “its internal links of ‘Single Market’ and monetary union” as these have a worldwide 
reach and impact due to the economic and political significance of the EU on a global 
scale. 
Before entering into discussions about the applicability of the theory to the study of the 
relevant EU institutions and their relation to the impacted Member States, the author will 
give a short account of the development of the globalization theory. Although different 
waves of globalization have been recognized by many scholars
102
 the current wave seems 
to be linked to economics. Barr and Avi-Yonah loosely define the ongoing period of 
globalization “as increasing global economic integration.”103 The date of origin varies 
depending on the literature but is usually related to either the expansion of foreign currency 
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trading
104
or with the liberalization of exchange and capital controls directly linked to the 
lowering of trade and investment barriers
105
. All of these changes took place during the 
1980s and were the result of the economic turmoil of the 1970s, the changing political 
affiliations and the end of the Cold War. These economic and political changes came to 
challenge the notion of sovereignty as the world economy globalized rapidly and the 
regional institutions of the EU came to question “the concept of the sovereign State as an 
entity that has exclusive jurisdiction over its territory.”106 Although the EU has not made 
the nation-state redundant, it is important to recognize that Eurozone Member States were 
undoubtedly overwhelmed by the financial crisis and that they may have felt safer under 
the umbrella of the EU. 
Therefore the theory of globalization can be applied to the study of EU institutions in 
regard to what Therborn calls the “state of (im)potence in the face of the global 
economy.”107 The effects of the crisis, which were discussed in detail in the previous 
chapter, clearly demonstrated the inability of individual Member States to counter the 
crisis on their own terms. Therborn addresses this concern when he writes that 
controversies “center around the questions about the extent that the state has lost or is 
going to lose the capacities to govern and control.”108 Having established the EMU, the 
Single Market and introduced a common currency, steps which were by Wallenstein 
considered as “achiev[ing] the financial underpinning necessary to pull away from its close 
political links to the United States” it seems as though Member States are only slowly 
waking up to the idea, that they single-handedly are not as powerful in the global-political 
arena as they used to be. 
When applying the theory of globalization on the establishment of a ‘complete’ EMU and 
a common supervisor, Berman offers an option for Law Beyond Governmental Institutions. 
His theory moves away from the traditional approach towards international law, which he 
argues has ignored “the multifaceted ways in which legal norms are disseminated, 
received, resisted, and imbibed “on the ground” in daily life”109. In order to avoid the 
missing out on the complexity of how law actually operates, he instead offers four areas to 
be considered:  
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1) legal consciousness – how people imbibe, transform and resists law over time;  
2) role of lower-level bureaucrats in how law is implemented in daily life;  
3) importance of networking of governments and/or non-governmental actors;  
and finally  
4) the legal pluralism approach of recognizing different affiliations and multiple 
conflicting norms which arise from this.
110
  
While all aspects are interesting and could be applied to the study, the focus will only be 
on the last two points. The networking aspect will be discussed below, while the fourth 
point regarding legal pluralism was already extensively explored in the previous section. 
When describing the network aspect of globalization, Berman refers to The Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision as a trans-governmental organization which has been 
responsible for financial stability around the world and which was mentioned earlier in this 
paper. As regards the EU, Berman also notes that with the establishment of the single 
market “the EU itself emerged as a “regulatory state” and sought to harmonize (or at least 
reconcile) the regulations of its diverse and growing members through a series of 
networks”111; a statement which on the one hand highlights the novelty of the EU as a 
regulator but also shows the interconnectedness of decision-making on EU level. The 
danger of such networks is present in the risk of reduced transparency, impede in political 
accountability and be subject to capture by powerful interests,
112113
 risks which could be of 
socio-legal concern in regards to networks and the Banking Supervision. 
3.3. Interconnectedness of Theories 
The notion of legal pluralism is not unfamiliar to those who apply globalization theories in 
their studies. Yet, even though scholars tend to recognize the importance of these two 
theories, Michaels points out that “the three disciplines equipped to deal with the 
transnationalization of law
114
 have been slow to embrace globalization, and one may add, 
legal pluralism.”115 The danger when creating an institution such as the joint supervision is 
not recognizing the increasing importance of legal pluralism and globalization. As regards 
a common solution to economic distress, a central global or European authority can be 
fruitful in preventing fragmentation. Michaels argues that the existence of a global 
authority to mediate is of utmost importance for the proliferation of treaties and 
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institutions, if these are to prevent decentralization into semiautonomous regimes which 
could consequently not be considered a unity.
116
 In regard to the EU such findings would 
support the need for a joint supervision, which would be aimed at eradicating 
fragmentation. This result would however be more likely if the decision-making bodies 
would recognize and embrace the theories of legal pluralism and globalization.    
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4. Methodology 
The method which was chosen to conduct the research and consequently gather empirical 
data is the method of evaluation research. Weiss writes that “evaluation is the systematic 
assessment of the operation and/or outcomes of a program or policy, compared to a set of 
explicit or implicit standards, as means of contributing to the improvement of the program 
or policy”.117 The method of evaluation research has been chosen due to its role in quality 
assurance of regulations and because the legislation is part of a public service to the 
citizens of the European Union. Therefore it is considered to have an important role in the 
stabilization of the EU as well as the global financial system. 
While there are different understandings of reality, the evaluation of the Supervision 
attempts to highlight certain aspects which can be empirically tested in order to give an all-
encompassing assessment of the situation. In this respect the following section will start 
with describing the method, followed by an explanation of the three different ways of 
collecting data. After that the reasons for the choice of the method will be given, after 
which acknowledgement of the criticism will be touched upon. 
4.1. Method Description 
Within the realms of evaluation research it is common to use ‘a mixture of quantitative 
and qualitative methods.’118 Therefore the research has been divided into the following 
three subsections:  
a) qualitative research in the forms of interviews;  
b) quantitative and qualitative analysis in the form of media analysis;  
c) quantitative research in the form of gathering and visualizing relevant statistics.  
4.1.2. Qualitative Research: Interviews 
One method applied while collecting data was the execution of interviews, as part of the 
qualitative research. The interview partners were chosen based on their involvement in 
process of establishing or executing the SSM. In total a number of four interviews were 
conducted with representatives from the institutions: European Commission, ECB and 
German Bundesbank. The European Commission and the German Bundesbank were 
contacted via e-mail. At the European Commission Benjamin Angel, Head of DG for 
Financial Institutions and Financial Stability was contacted due to his privileged role and 
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indepth understanding of the topic. Angel further recommended conducting an interview 
with Martin Merlin, Head of Internal Market and Services. As Mr. Merlin was no longer 
available on the arranged date, 3
rd
 of April 2014, Charlotte Sickermann from the same 
team, was instead interviewed. Both interviews took place in Brussels, Belgium after 
having been arranged via email. The interview with Benjamin Angel took 1h11min and the 
interview with Charlotte Sickermann lasted 40min - the transcript of both interviews can 
be found in the Appendix. 
The contact with the German Bundesbank went via their website and a request for an 
interview on the topic of the SSM was sent. After the email was processed, a SSM expert 
contacted the author outlining on one hand the willingness to be interviewed and on the 
other hand the legal circumstances. The interview took place at the German Bundesbank 
February 6
th
 2014 and lasted for 1h30min. As the interview could not be recorded, it was 
subsequently not transcribed and only a summary of the interview could be published. The 
contact with the ECB Expert was established via a recommendation. As the interviewee 
wished to remain anonymous, the disclosed information remained confidential. The 
interview was organized outside the ECB premises and lasted for approximately 45min. 
All interviewees were presented with the questions before the interview took place. The 
final results were either transcribed or summarized
119
 and the key findings are presented in 
the next section: results.  
The purpose of conducting interviews was to “explore the views, experiences, beliefs 
and/or motivations of individuals on a specific matter” as this method is believed to 
“provide a ‘deeper’ understanding of social phenomena that would be obtained from purely 
quantitative methods”.120 By interviewing people from different institutions, who have 
been involved in the establishment of the SSM, insightful information can be collected. 
The analytical method used to process the interviews is the Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). It offers insight into how a given person, within a given 
context, makes sense of his/her social world and the meanings that particular experiences, 
events and states hold for the participant.
121
 By applying this method the interviewer will 
not only focus on what is said, but also how it is said and what underlying messages and 
emotions are being communicated. 
                                                 
119 See Appendix 
120 Gill, P., Stewart, K., Treasure, E. & B. Chadwick. (2008). Methods of data collection in qualitative research: 
interviews and focus groups. British Dental Journal. Vol. 204(6): 291 
121 Smith, Jonathan. A. & Mike Osborn. (2007). Four: Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. In: Smith, Jonathan A. 
Qualitative Psychology: A Practical Guide to Research Methods. Thousand Oaks, California. SAGE Publications Ltd: 53 
28 
 
IPA can be defined as wishing “to explore the individual’s personal perception or account 
of an event or state as opposed to attempting to produce an objective record of the event or 
state itself.”122 The method has a theoretical commitment to the cognitive, linguistic, 
affective and physical being and aims at establishing a link between what is told, thought 
and the emotional state of the people questioned.
123
 The approach allows the conduct of a 
small sample in which each case is analyzed individually the aim thereby is to gain insight 
into the perceptions and understandings of the person interviewed. In order to grasp this 
apparent reality, a section reflecting “the perceived attitude towards the project” will be 
incorporated, which is aimed at capturing the epistemological aspects of what has been 
said during the interview. 
Furthermore the form of the interviews is semi-structured, enabling a dialogue to arise 
guided by, but not limited to, the questions and the schedule.
124
 This type of interview 
“consists of several key questions that help to define the areas to be explored, but also 
allows the interviewer or interviewee to diverge in order to purse an idea or response in 
more detail.”125 As this type of research only asks for a limited amount of interview 
partners, due to the intensity of the results as well as the answers providing far more 
insight into the subject matter, than a higher number of interviews could have. The results 
will be processed through transcription which is the procedure of typing out the entire 
interview.
 126
 Within this procedure, the exact method which will be applied is called 
denaturalism - an approach which removes idiosyncratic elements of speech (e.g., stutters, 
pauses, nonverbal, involuntary and vocalizations).
127
 Although the incorporation of these 
aspects could have been beneficial in terms of epistemology it was not used due to the 
previously mentioned segment on “the perceived attitude towards the project”, aimed at 
capturing the knowledge, understanding and emotional state of the interviewees. 
As not all interviews could be recorded and thus transcribed due to legal matters,
128
 a 
method to deal with anonymity and confidentiality needed to be applied. While the aspects 
of anonymity and confidentiality are in fact distinct but nonetheless related concepts, they 
will be defined individually. Confidentiality refers to some information being ‘mundane’ 
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while other information may be viewed as highly confidential by participants. This 
information is thus not intended to be shared with others.
129
 Anonymity is when a person’s 
identity is kept secret.
130
 Within this research both aspects will be applied, in one interview 
anonymity prevailed due to matters of legal clearance from the institution, while in the 
other interview anonymity rests on the concept of confidentiality due to “principles of 
privacy and respect for autonomy”131 of the individual being guaranteed. 
4.1.2. Qualitative and Quantitative Research: Analyzing Media Messages 
Applying the method of media content analysis, the two publications which were used 
were the newspaper Financial Times and the news agency Reuters. Financial times was 
used as a source, as it places a special emphasis on international business and economic 
news, is considered “one of the world’s leading business news organizations, [and] is 
recognized internationally for its authority, integrity and accuracy.”132 The second source 
Reuters was chosen to be used as a control group in order to eliminate bias and create 
reliable baseline data. The news agency is “the world’s largest international multimedia 
news agency, providing investing news, world news, business news (…)” and makes sure 
that its journalist is “subject to an Editorial Handbook which requires fair presentation and 
disclosure of relevant interests.”133 All articles written on the topic of the SSM between 
July 2012 and July 2014 were collected, counted (Financial Times: 100; Reuters: 188) and 
subsequently categorized into tone (affirmative, critical or neutral) and subject 
(institutional level, Member State level or other). 
The findings of the media coverage will be defined by the search items ‘Single Supervisory 
Mechanism’ and ‘SSM’. All articles containing these words will then be assessed on 
whether they seem positive or negative towards the establishment of the SSM. A title such 
as “a highly imperfect banking union”134 will be considered negative; “slow but real 
progress on resolving Eurozone crisis”135 will be considered positive; and “Transcript of 
interview with Danièle Nouy
136”137 will be considered neutral. Subsequently the articles 
will be assessed on whether they highlight an issue on an institutional level, a Member 
State level, or other issue. After giving the total amount of search hits, of articles 
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containing the topic Single Supervisory Mechanism/SSM, only the articles with a clear 
focus on this topic will be evaluated. The time period will cover the two years since the 
agreement on a joint supervision and a banking union, i.e. July 2012 to July 2014.  
In order to execute content analysis (of media messages) conclusions will be drawn from 
the observations of press releases and media coverage of the ‘banking union’ and the SSM. 
The method enables the research to study and analyze communications in “a systematic, 
objective and quantitative manner to measure variables” although it sometimes runs the 
risk of being used simply “to determine the relative emphasis of frequency of various 
communication phenomena.”138 Within this research paper, the method is used in order to 
highlight not only the frequency but also the meaning of the messages found in press 
releases and articles. Subsequently these communications will be analyzed both in 
qualitative as well as quantitative terms to give a more holistic insight into the subject 
matter. All articles which were analyzed are listed in the Appendix of this paper. 
A definition of content analysis is  
the systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have been 
assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules, and the analysis of 
relationships involving those values using statistical methods, in order to describe the 
communication, draw interferences about its meaning, or infer from the communication to its 
context, both of production and consumption.
139
 
Through the application of this definition for the conduct of the research, the review 
of official articles published in media will be done via “observation” and “evaluation 
of documents.”140 The reason that these methods have been chosen, is that they can 
give an indication of the interaction on a national level, interaction between national 
and supranational institutions as well as document issues on a supranational level. To 
address the gap between what has been published on official sites
141
 a documentation 
of the media coverage in terms of amounts of articles published related to the subject 
and their content will be executed. 
4.1.3. Quantitative Research: Quantifying Relevant Statistics 
A considerable amount of documents covering the SSM has been made available by the 
European Commission and the ECB. As the mechanism will start operating in November 
of this year, both the EU institutions and the NCBs should ideally be informing their 
citizens of the progress made, decisions which have been taken and consequences that 
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these changes have on the banking systems in the individual countries. Even though it is 
difficult to measure the commitment towards this project by simply considering the amount 
that has been written about it, it will nonetheless be an indication of the transparency and 
commitment of the individual Member States. Another issue which will highlight 
discrepancies and thus a possible concern for the SSM, is that Member States will 
individually decide which national institution will be responsible for the supervision. 
The data was collected by analyzing the websites of the EU institutions and Euro area 
Member States central bank and national supervisor websites. To address the two separate 
issues different approached were applied: in order to retrieve information on who has 
responsibility for national supervision, the NCBs websites were searched for links to 
banking supervision. If no information was provided it was considered whether this 
country had a separate supervisor, responsible for banking supervision. If still no 
information could be found, an email was sent to both the NCB and the NCA in order to 
receive clarification. For the information on publications related to the SSM each NCB 
website was searched for publications related to the topic. The amount of published 
information should serve as an indicator of transparency and importance of the mechanism 
for corresponding NCB.  
In terms of data collection, the different websites
142
 from which information has been 
collected will be categorized as the different units
143
. Subsequently the information found 
on these websites, is labeled variables as they represent “any characteristic of the unit we 
are interested in and want to collect.”144 Examples of such units are on the one hand “the 
number of publications on the SSM topic” which can be found on the different sites and on 
the other hand “institutions with supervisory authority on national level”. The results will 
be used as indicators in assessing the EU institutions and national organizations, in terms 
of problems on national and/or supranational level; concerns which could be indicating the 
lacking keenness and preparedness of the different establishments. 
The data was collected using quantitative research methods which can be defined as 
“explaining phenomena by collecting numerical data that are analyzed using 
mathematically based methods (in particular statistics).”145 When applied to the research 
which has been conducted, the phenomena which will be explained are the commitments 
towards the SSM project, through the collection of numerical indicators 
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(publications/statements by the institutions and the NCBs; existence of an independent 
supervisory authority). Despite the fact that the data did “not appear in quantitative form” 
it could still be collected in a quantitative way.
146
 This numerical data will subsequently be 
translated into statistics and visualized in graphs, thereby relying on “mathematically based 
methods.”147 The reason the data is expressed in numerical form, is the attempt to 
objectively display the current state of the institution and the Member States commitments 
to the project analyzed.   
4.2. Choice of Methods 
The general method of evaluation research was chosen as it was most suitable for an 
assessment of the research problem, as well as its intent to provide a critical analysis of the 
framework being established. The method enables a high level of transparency and the 
philosophy of positivism is additionally concerned with “explicit or transparent procedures 
or methods.”148 By executing evaluation research in terms of positivism, sound knowledge 
could be achieved, which is sometimes also referred to as procedural objectivity.
149
 The 
method enables replication of the research, if necessary, as well as allowing a level of 
certitude regarding the soundness of the gathered information. This is done to avoid 
research being distorted on the part of the researcher. The applied methods have been used 
to “guarantee a degree of quality control” and to “ensure the internalization of standards 
and values underlying any particular discipline.”150 As quantitative research is often 
described as “positivist” and qualitative research is seen as “subjectivist”151 both were 
used, in order to avoid a unilateral analysis. The methodology has thus been chosen in 
order to guarantee transparency, soundness as well as both quantitative and qualitative data 
to give a balanced view of the situation. 
4.3.  Methodological Criticism: Acknowledgement 
The method of evaluation research has been criticized on the accounts that the 
methodological standards have been considered lower than in other areas of social science, 
as ‘small-scale’ evaluations are considered poorly resourced.152 While the author 
acknowledges that the scale of empirical data collection and research could have been 
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more extensive and encompassing, it should nevertheless be considered that empirical data 
has been collected to the best of the author’s ability. Further criticism has been expressed 
in respect to a certain level of managerial bias, which can be part of evaluation research 
when it is executed on the level of paid-consultants. This possibility also questions the 
intellectual independence of researchers because the “evaluation industry draws on 
mainstream social science for its methods, but often tries to keep its distance from the 
theoretical and methodological debates that interest university-based researchers.”153 
Having acknowledged these points of concern, the author of the paper can guarantee that 
the work has not been influenced by any external interest groups and scientific theories and 
methods have been used to make the paper scientifically viable. 
A concern which does prevail in the collection of data is the so-called “impossibility of 
telling facts from fictions in stories from the field”154 thereby questioning the positivist 
approach of producing reliable data. Even with the attempt of trying to collect data as 
scientifically as possible, it should be recognized that the information gathered is collected 
in terms of the current mindset of the author which is always accompanied by a certain 
level of bias. This concern is also expressed as a methodological obstacle by Banakar who 
addresses the tension between “‘experience-near’ concepts and perspectives of insiders on 
their field activity, and the ‘experience-distant’ theoretical concepts of outsiders on the 
inside’ perceptions, beliefs, intentions, and actions.”155 As was written in respect to the 
attempt of producing ‘validity’ and ‘reliability’ in social science, “the correspondence 
theory of truth is untenable because the only things with which we can compare statements 
are other statements.”156 Having said this, the methodological approach was consistently 
applied, as objectively as possible, in order to produce scientific results. Problems related 
to the execution and application of the different methods in gathering relevant information, 
will be discussed in the next section Results. 
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5. Results 
This section will present the empirical data gathered to answer the overarching research 
question, as well as the relevant sub-questions. The material has been divided into the three 
subsections of:  
 qualitative data in the form of interviews,  
 qualitative and quantitative data in the form of media content and  
 quantitative data in the form of institutional indicators 
Only the relevant findings and figures will be presented in this section as questions, 
transcripts of interviews and other more explicit data will be found in the Appendix 
section. Finally a criticism towards the collected data well be presented, outlining the 
limitations of the collected results. 
5.1. Qualitative Results: Interviews 
Person
157
 working at the Deutsche Bundesbank 
Summary of Interview: The supervision is necessary in order to integrate the financial 
markets and guarantee higher standards for clients throughout the Eurozone. The positive 
effects of integration could already be seen in the currency union which already enabled 
European banks to deepen their integration. The ‘banking union’ and SSM are necessary to 
break the ‘vicious-circle’ between banks and sovereigns as well as removing the home 
base bias which exist if NCAs set the rules and are in charge. Before and without the SSM 
almost everything was done on national basis and Member States would tend to favor their 
own banks. Additionally the legal bases are different in every Member State and consist of 
special features which would be eradicated or at least lowered through intensified 
harmonization.  
Furthermore, the SSM and the ‘banking union’ are necessary as it may be able to detect 
risks on the EU level and address these directly. On an institutional level, the EBA was not 
powerful enough and, e.g. stress tests were not a direct success. As the ECB will be 
applying EU law it is both supported and questioned before the ECJ, which gives the SSM 
a stronger backing. Bankruptcy risk of banks will be minimized, which is positive due to 
its severe effects on society. The euro is strengthened as risk is reduced and a feeling of 
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injustice
158
 will decrease. Even if risk is minimized it cannot be completely eliminated and 
tax payers’ money will continue to stand as the final backstop.  
The consequences for the German central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and the German 
Supervisor (BaFin) is the decision, who will supervise the German banks. The two 
institutions are currently discussing the division of the workload/responsibilities. While the 
ECB will supervise some banks, Germany and France are the countries with the largest 
banking sectors and the most banks in the Eurozone, which leaves a considerable amount 
of work left on national level. On an operational level German supervisors must learn 
English/take English lessons as the vehicular language of the SSM is English.
159
 
Perceived Attitude towards Project
160
: The interviewee seemed to be very optimistic 
towards the banking union and the SSM in terms of the benefits they would provide for 
Europe as a continent. Affiliations were not nationalistic and did not stress the “loss-of-
power” towards a supranational level to be a problem. Instead the interviewee continuously 
highlighted the positive effects for the banking sector and for financial markets. The 
enthusiasm seemed genuine, as did the personal dedication towards the project, especially 
when considering that the interviewee knew that he would remain anonymous.  
Person working at the European Central Bank 
Summary of Interview: Having worked for the ECB as well as for the central bank of his 
Member State, the Senior Expert summarizes his experience with transnational cooperation 
within the Eurozone and the EU as follows: ”Cooperation across central banks has been 
particularly fruitful to build up the Euro system (ECB + national central banks of euro area 
countries) and European System of Central Banks (extended to all EU national central 
banks) and operationally run it in its monetary policy function, stepwise extended – by the 
European legislator also for this reason – to financial stability analysis and policy, and now 
to banking supervision. The governance of the Euro system and ESCB is often recognized 
to be smoother and more effective than that in other institutions.” 
While two years has in fact been a short time for the establishment of a joint supervision, 
the risk of not having supervision seem to outweigh the disadvantages of creating a 
common body. Throughout the crisis, a certain amount of regulatory arbitrage of certain 
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institutions became prevalent thereby increasing the risk of the system. Therefore a risk 
sensitive regulatory regime is necessary in order to lower the risk of exposure of the Single 
Market in general and financial institutions in particular. As systemic risk is highly 
contagious, due to its ability to risk the collapse of an entire financial system or market, it 
will be in the responsibility of the ECB to limit risk exposure of individual institutions 
thereby creating a sound financial system. If supervision would remain on national level, 
risk and excess exposure would perhaps not be recognized in time. As the ECB will have 
insight into the operations of all the financial institutions it will be in an advantageous 
position to assess the entire market.  
Perceived Attitude towards Project: While this was a rather short and technical interview, 
the interviewee showed a lot of insight into the field of supervision in general, and close 
cooperation between the various institutions in particular. Considering that the interviewee 
will remain anonymous lends further credibility to his statements as they will not be put in 
relation with him directly. Generally it became apparent that the ECB Expert was very 
passionate about the subject matter and talked freely about his observation and experience. 
Charlotte Sickermann at the Commission (DG Internal Market and Services) 
Summary of Interview: Many Central Banks have the task of banking supervision, thus the 
move to grant the ECB supervisory powers is perhaps more an evolutional step and not a 
change of direction. In the example of the United Kingdom, banking supervision had been 
part of the responsibility of the Bank of England before it was moved to the SFA 
approximately 10 years ago. Today the responsibility is once again part of the 
competencies of the Bank of England. Even if Germany is rather doubtful on placing 
supervision in the hands of the central bank, thus sharing competencies, for other central 
banks it is a natural part of operation. 
In regard to an increasing EU power structure, the supervisory competencies have been 
modeled in a similar way to monetary policy i.e. there is a European and a national 
dimension. The ECB will have responsibilities towards the whole banking sector and all 
Euro area countries with the power to take over supervision of any bank, at any time. The 
ECB cannot become lenient towards one country or towards certain banks as this would 
have huge implications. While these factors discipline the ECB to look at the whole 
system, it will also discipline Member States to act within the guidance given by the ECB. 
The ECB has a lot of rights beforehand: it can request information at any point in time, it 
can give general guidance of how to conduct supervision, it will develop a supervisory 
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manual and the NCAs will have to send major decisions to the ECB either ex ante or ex 
post. The ECB stepping in to take over supervision of otherwise nationally supervised 
banks, will however remain a “nuclear-option” and only applied in the worst-case scenario. 
The previously mentioned strong European dimension is the forte of the ECB and thus the 
SSM. On a national level, Supervision will be executed by JSTs consisting of five 
members from the ECB working with a specific amount of national supervisors from the 
respective Member State who will look towards the European and not the national 
interests. Such observations will make it harder for the Supervisory Board to act in a way 
that the Council may have acted, as the observations rests on relatively objective 
investigations. Unlike previous undertakings
161
 where national interests prevailed, the 
Supervision within the realms of the ECB is likely to be more successful as they have so 
far been effective in its monetary policy and there have not been issues about national 
interests. Consequently the system will quickly adapt a European stance and a take on a 
European view. 
In terms of temporality, the legal provisions for supervision were already in the Treaty in 
the form of the legal base 127(6) on which the framework has been established. It shows 
that the responsible entities at the time, were considering joint supervision beforehand. It 
was also already discussed when the EMU was established but a union can only be brought 
forward or be deepened in terms of a crisis as it is difficult for Member States to surrender 
or transfer power to a European institution. Ten years ago such an undertaking would not 
have been possible, as “we were still in a very national system in terms of supervision.”162  
Perceived Attitude towards Project: 
Ms. Sickermann, who had joined the Commission from the Deutsche Bundesbank in 2012, 
had been able to witness the project development from up close. During the interview she 
did not display any emotional connections or personal opinions but had in advanced 
prepared answers to all questions. Nevertheless she seemed to be convinced of the 
necessity as well as the advantages that a joint supervision will have for the Euro area. 
Nevertheless it was difficult to assess the meaning of the project on her personally and 
whether or not, there were any concerns towards its establishment. 
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Benjamin Angel at the Commission (DG Financial Institutions and Financial Stability) 
Summary of Interview: Angel starts by referring to studies if supervision should be in the 
hands of the central bank, after considering whether the banking union supervision is a 
natural step for the EMU and finding that it differs from country to country. The 
conclusion is that the ECB will have to pay more attention to liquidity than traditional 
supervisors which have been more focused on solvency. While there were some provisions 
in the Treaty for entrusting the ECB with supervisory powers it “did not necessarily point 
to entrusting the supervision to the ECB; but rather some aspects.” When working on the 
first package five years ago it took considerable time and effort to convince people to 
exchange supervisory information and thus “the idea that you could move to a common 
supervisor was pure science fiction.” Only after the severe crisis was it possible to 
convince people to take such a step.  
Regarding the statement by Padoa-Schioppa
163
 on the need for a “true and effective 
collective euro area supervisor”, Angel says that, especially in economics, anything can be 
predicted. If one waits long enough predictions are bound to become true. Predicting the 
banking union was not possible as Member States only gave up sovereignty as a result of 
the crisis. This combined with the expected advantages of having the ECB as a supervisor 
were the reasons that this step was taken relatively quickly in regard to the gradual 
development of the EU.  
The ECB is a strong institution which has proven itself during the crisis but when 
supervision is shared within a banking union, it is about sharing consequences of mistakes. 
This is why the ECB will be accompanied with the SRM and a common fund. Joint 
supervision is almost as big a step as sharing a currency. The ECB lends credibility to the 
market, it will not be caught up in the environment as NCAs would and local interests will 
be far away from the decision-making center. In terms of power the ECB can take any 
decision on banking there is and can call on any bank within the Euro area. The operations 
and functioning of the Board are not considered a problem, especially when headed by 
Nouy. She is considered a strong character, not afraid to move into the decision-taking 
process if necessary. 
On an institutional level the ECB will face the issue of balancing the two tasks: monetary 
policy and supervision. Problems could arise when cross-border banks have problems, 
which Angel considers “the worst case, but more for the ECB than for the resolution 
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authority.” What is currently also lacking on an institutional level is accountability, 
although the ECB is accountable to the EP, the EP does not necessarily represent the 
citizens of the EU as they do not recognize themselves in the EP. Therefore there is a risk 
of making the average EU citizen more hostile towards the EU. The ECB is lacking 
cooperation and accountability conscience, and while this ivory tower is useful in terms of 
monetary policy, it is not good for supervision. 
In terms of creating a common handbook and setting up operations, these things had to be 
done in a very short time. The handbook, which was a result of negotiations between ECB 
and NCAs, has been made very quickly. The result is that the ECB will be in charge but in 
cooperation with the NCAs. JSTs will head the supervision but there are of course 
problems with language as not every banker is fluent in English. When making the JSTs 
the ECB must be careful in balancing the backgrounds of the staff in order to avoid 
possible collusions. In this regard national differences can be an advantage because it will 
give a critical perspective on the side of the JST towards the work of the NCAs. As regards 
the setup of the ECB supervisory department, it means recruiting a large number of new 
staff. This does not only refer to the 700 people which have been recruited or the aimed 
1,000, but rather the entire supporting staff. This could create problems also for the NCAs 
and the NCBs who are left with the “leftovers” of the ECB. On the level of Member States 
two different situations (Cyprus and Ireland) show why it is necessary to have a joint 
supervision. Had such supervision been in place before both of the collapses and 
consequences could have been dealt with, making them less severe. In another example 
Germany froze the assets of Lehman Brothers in an overnight action
164
, money which 
could otherwise have been transferred to the UK. Had they allowed a transfer of money, 
perhaps the failure of the entire Lehman Brothers corporation, could have been avoided. 
While it is the role of a NCA to behave in this manner, on a European level decisions like 
this will be taken by the ECB which has insight into the operations of the entire system. In 
an additional example, Germany and Austria took the decision, not to allow a transfer of 
funds from their countries to Italy by Unicredit. This is something which is normally part 
of everyday operations and such behavior could jeopardize the stability of financial 
institutions with cross-border impact. While it is in the interest of the German, French and 
Italians to protect their interest and markets, protection of national interests have not been 
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“as bad as it was expected and should be seen as a normal process when constructing a 
supervisory authority” considering the gigantic effects supervision can have on Member 
States. 
While the UK remains critical towards the banking union, other non-Eurozone countries 
(such as Sweden and Denmark) want to join the SSM. The problem with the UK, which 
always opts-out is that it is putting itself in the corner and it has become more their own 
problem than that of the EU and Eurozone. The fears of the UK have however materialized 
in the increasing power of the ECB, making other institutions (such as the EBA) satellite 
structures. The only option for the UK to stay powerful is in joining the euro, which is an 
unlikely scenario. Only focusing on cultural differences and state centered action is not a 
solution to the problem. On a national level problems can also occur by playing it too safe, 
as was seen in the case of Spain. 
In regards to implementing the SSM now it is a necessary step. The issue of large 
recruitment may seem overwhelming, but 1,000 people is not much if you compare with to 
other institutions or large banks. The complexities of large banks should not be 
underestimated. Despite the toll the crisis took on banks they have again become too big to 
fail. As could be seen in the case of Anglo Irish, it cost Ireland 40 points of its GDP 
overnight. BNP Paribas accounts for 120% of the French GDP, with such large numbers it 
is impossible even for big states such as France to rescue the bank. States are at risk today, 
not only because of the banks which are in fact too big to fail, but also because of the large 
banking sector in the EU. Systemic risk is contagious and 2/3 of European credit comes 
from its banks. If the banks fall then the whole economic activity falls and market 
financing is not created overnight. 
In conclusion there is not an option for not creating a joint supervision or banking union. If 
you put the experts in a room together with the finance ministry and the central banks they 
will find an infinite amount of reasons arguing against the establishment of the supervision. 
During the decision-making process however, many heads of states did not realize the 
importance and consequences of the process and it was a top-down decision. The ECB 
entered discussions and convinced the governments that it was best suited for this position. 
In retrospect, the result of the supervision and the negotiations has been quite good. 
Although it is a huge step for people like him, most citizens do not care about the 
supervision and its impact is not visible on a social level unless there is a crisis.  
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Perceived Attitude towards Project: 
Throughout the interview it becomes apparent that Angel is very dedicated and 
knowledgeable about the topic of supervision. Although he did not have time to read the 
question in advance his answers were very detailed and provided great insight into the 
different aspects which need to be considered. It becomes apparent that the dedication 
towards the project is genuine as are the concerns in regard to the power of the ECB as a 
supervisor. Despite these concerns he seems to be positive towards the outlook of the 
project and that certain matters will become more visible when it is in operation. In 
conclusion, the advantages and possible consequences of having a joint supervision 
overweigh clearly the negative aspects. 
5.2. Qualitative and Quantitative Results: Review of Media Content 
5.2.1. Amount of Media Coverage July 2012 to July 2014 
The table on Amount of Media Coverage by the two publications, Financial Times and 
Reuters show the exact amount of articles published between July 2012 and July 2014. The 
articles were found using the key words SSM and Single Supervisory Mechanism. The 
data was subsequently divided into Annual Quarters to show the trend of media coverage 
on the subject. 
 
July 2012-July 2014 
Publications 
Financial Times Reuters 
Q3 2012 14 28 
Q4 2012 21 51 
Q1 2013 8 12 
Q2 2013 16 27 
Q3 2013 8 21 
Q4 2013 12 12 
Q1 2014 12 17 
Q2 2014 5 14 
Q3 2014 4 6 
Total Amount 100 188 
The table “Comparing FT and Reuters Reporting” show that Reuters has more frequently 
published articles on the SSM and that the amount of articles published peaked in the 2
nd
 
Quarter of 2012 and has since then never reached the same amount of media attention. 
Despite the fact that the mechanism will start operating within the next few months, media 
coverage on the topic for 2014 has remained incredibly low. 
42 
 
 
5.2.2. Affiliations towards SSM Project 
The tables “Tone of Articles Published by FT” and “Tone of Articles Published by 
Reuters” reflect the three possible attitudes of the articles: “affirmative”, “critical” and 
neutral. 
There is a clear difference both in regards to the number of articles published by the two 
different publications as well as in the tone towards the SSM. Reuters seems to be more 
balanced in their tone towards the project: 44% affirmative, 33% critical and 23% neutral. 
Financial Times was more one sided in their reporting: 53% critical, 25% affirmative and 
22% neutral. 
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5.3. Quantitative Results:  
5.3.1. Press Releases/Publications on Institutional Websites 
The table shows the “search results” generated from the search engines on the EU 
institutions and NCBs websites. The list encompasses the ECB, the EC and all of the Euro 
area NCBs in alphabetical order. The search words used were ‘SSM’ and ‘Single 
Supervisory Mechanism’. 
State/Institution Year Press Releases 
Single Supervisory 
Mechanism/SSM 
EU-ECB 2012-2014 2230 
EU- European Commission 2012-2014 1635 
Austria- Oesterreische Nationalbank 2012-2014 111 
Belgium- Nationale Bank van België / Banque 
Nationale de Belgique 
2012-2014 107 
Cyprus- Central Bank of Cyprus 2012-2014 10 
Estonia- Eesti Pank 2012-2014 9 
Finland- Suomen Pankki- Finlands Bank 2012-2014 54 
France- Banque de France 2012-2014 267 
Germany- Deutsche Bundesbank 2012-2014 105 
Greece- Bank of Greece 2012-2014 20 
Ireland- Banc Ceannais na hÈireann/Central Bank of 
Ireland 
2012-2014 60 
Italy- Banca d’Italia 2012-2014 68 
Latvia- Latvijas Banka 2012-2014 1
165
 
Luxembourg- Banque Centrale du Luxembourg 2012-2014 0
166
 
Malta- Bank Ċentrali ta’ Malta / Central Bank of 
Malta 
2012-2014 19 
Netherlands- De Nederlandsche Bank 2012-2014 50 
Portugal- Banco de Portugal 2012-2014 1 
Slovakia- Náradná banka Slovenska 2012-2014 43 
Slovenia- Banka Slovenije 2012-2014 30 
Spain- Banco de España 2012-2014 197 
5.3.2. List of NCBs, National Supervisors and Separation of Power 
The table considers the separation of power of some Member States in regard to banking 
supervision. The table lists which body has thus far been responsible for supervision on a 
national level and if this is a separate body from the Central Bank. 
  
                                                 
165 Although the search engine recognized SSM, Single Supervisory Mechanism and what is the Latvian translation of 
Single Supervisory Mechanism “Vienotais uzraudzības mehānisms, VUM” 
166 One result found after SSM was translated into the French version MSU 
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State Central Bank National Supervisor Separate 
from 
CB? 
Austria Oesterreische Nationalbank Österreichische 
Finanzmarktaufsicht 
Yes 
Belgium Nationale Bank van België / 
Banque Nationale de 
Belgique 
Nationale Bank van België / 
Banque Nationale de Belgique 
No
167
 
Cyprus Central Bank of Cyprus Central Bank of Cyprus No 
Estonia Eesti Pank Estonian Financial Supervision 
Authority 
Yes 
Finland Suomen Pankki- Finlands 
Bank 
Finnish Financial Supervisory 
Authority 
Yes 
France Banque de France French Prudential Supervisory 
Authority 
No 
Germany Deutsche Bundesbank BaFin Yes 
Greece Bank of Greece Department for the 
Supervision of Credit and 
Financial Institutions 
No 
Ireland Banc Ceannais na 
hÈireann/Central Bank of 
Ireland 
Banc Ceannais na 
hÈireann/Central Bank of 
Ireland 
No 
Italy Banca d’Italia Banca d’Italia No 
Latvia Latvijas Banka Financial and Capital Market 
Commission Latvia 
Yes 
Luxembourg Banque Centrale du 
Luxembourg 
CSSF Yes
168
 
Malta Bank Ċentrali ta’ Malta / 
Central Bank of Malta 
Malta Financial Services 
Authority 
Yes 
Netherlands De Nederlandsche Bank De Nederlandsche Bank No 
Portugal Banco de Portugal Banco de Portugal No 
Slovakia Náradná banka Slovenska Náradná banka Slovenska No 
Slovenia Banka Slovenije Banka Slovenije No 
Spain Banco de España Banco de España No 
5.4. Data Limitations 
Although the applied methods allowed for encompassing insight into the subject matter, 
some limitations arose, this hindered the application of the methods from gathering all 
relevant information. Some of the limitations in regard to the interviews were that a higher 
number of interviews from an array of interviewees could have widened the spectrum of 
the generated research results. Such interviews could have been conducted with more 
people from the already interviewed institutions (in order to get different perspectives) as 
                                                 
167 Information not provided for on website but through explicit question by email  
168 Information not provided for on website but through explicit question by email  
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well as representatives from different interest groups (e.g. NCB, NCA, EBA, financial 
institutions). Questioning these groups could have given insight into the different reactions 
of the various groups and voices on the topic. Such data would thus have contributed with 
a broader perspective of opinions. 
In terms of media content analysis, a number of diverse newspapers from several diverse 
countries could have provided a deeper understanding of the problem from a Member State 
perspective. Insight into these perspectives could have shown the origins of concern as 
well as reduce a possible national bias. Further, a more in-depth analysis of the collected 
articles could have more critically displayed if a certain theme had been reoccurring, 
disappeared or persisted over time. Such an analysis would also have allowed for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the underlying media message of the analyzed articles. 
Considering the results of the media analysis, it could also have been interesting to 
question both publications on the used tone, with Financial Times being assessed as very 
critical with 53% and Reuters more balanced with 44% affirmative and 33% critical.   
Finally, as regards the data collected from the official websites, it could have had an added 
value if a statement on the SSM would have been provided by each NCB, and if applicable 
NCA. This could also have been done using a survey or questionnaire which could have 
allowed for a direct comparison of the results. Another difficulty which arose when 
collecting the data was the language barrier: although the official language of the SSM is 
English, many countries did not provide any information in English, on other websites it 
was difficult to know what SSM is called in the respective language. A greater insight into 
the published data would have allowed a more detailed analysis of the attitude towards the 
mechanism.  
The suggested limitations concerning the data collection could possibly have been 
eradicated in a more encompassing research project. One of the greatest difficulties which 
keeps reappearing is the language barrier, which would have enabled a wide-ranging 
understanding of different affiliations. Further the explicit search for criticism of the SSM 
could have been intensified, in order to understand why the SSM and the banking union 
have been contested by many. As sovereign power is being granted to a supranational 
level, research should be conducted to reflect criticism thereof as such criticism can be 
valuable in strengthening the undertaking. Acknowledging weaknesses can be useful in 
strengthening a legislation and make it more suitable for a diverse society.  
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6. Analysis 
The following section will set out to explore if European banking supervision is 
anachronistic in light of the research results. Although the Treaty of Maastricht Article 
126(7) provided a legal basis for the supervision, pre-crisis Europe was not ready to give 
up power. As highlighted by Benjamin Angel
169
 only five years ago it took considerable 
effort to convince the different states to change supervisory information and thus “the idea 
that you could move to a common supervisor was pure science fiction.” This was 
supported by Charlotte Sickermann who said that ten years ago “we were still in a very 
national system in terms of supervision.”170 Starting from the realization that a joint 
supervision would have been useful but not politically possible earlier, this analysis sets 
out to evaluate the empirical data in light of the three sub-questions.
171
 The analysis will 
provide a basis for answering the overarching research question, in the light of socio-legal 
theory: Is the SSM anachronistic? 
 
6.1 Are the European Union Institutions
172
 ready for a European Banking 
Supervisor? 
There have been a number of concerns expressed in regards to the appointment of the ECB 
as supervisor of the Eurozone banks. While some question the ECBs ability to keep 
monetary policy and supervision separate, others such as the Commission, have been 
concerned with granting the ECB even more power than it already has. When considering 
the amount of articles which have been published on the topic of SSM it shows that the 
total amount of affirmative articles represent 38% while the number of critical articles 
towards the SSM project was only 2% higher. If one considers the attitudes expressed 
within these articles, it becomes apparent that only 26% focus on institutional concerns. 
                                                 
169 See Appendix: Transcript of Interview with Benjamin Angel 
170 See Appendix: Transcript of Interview with Charlotte Sickermann 
171 See Introduction: Aim, Hypothesis and Approach 
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This shows that there still seems to be a mismatch if the affiliations towards the project in 
terms of doubts and support which are not concerning the question of the ECB being the 
right institution for the job.  
Two years ago the decision on the SSM was taken by the process of unanimity. Thus the 
decision was based on the support of all 28 Member States and not only those which will 
be directly and automatically affected by it as part of the Eurozone. The concept of 
unanimity has been discussed within the realms of legal pluralism as allowing for a greater 
equality of participation and will be considered in more detail in the next section. What is 
relevant in regard to unanimity is however the need for a normative system which occupies 
the same social field (as the ECB will in the role of Supervisor) to negotiate hybrid legal 
spaces. In the first round of discussions consensus was achieved on a common supervision 
and the result was the ECB “convincing the heads of states that the [it] would be most 
suited for this position.”173 Furthermore, the different voices of both Eurozone and non-
Eurozone were being considered in the establishment of the handbook. It was a result of 
negotiations between the ECB and the NCAs who gave their input into the subject 
matter.
174
 
Recognizing the existence of different legal voices did not however seem to be part of the 
process leading up to the agreement on a common banking supervisor. As was already 
mentioned earlier in this research paper, the topic had previously been referred to only a 
small amount of people (i.e. parliamentarians, academics and professional naysayers
175
) a 
statement which is supported by Benjamin Angel who said that “if you put the experts in a 
room [with] the finance ministry and the central bank, each of them will find 200 reasons 
arguing that it will not work.”176 This indicates that the ideal amount of normative sources 
in terms of political, rhetorical and legal statements was not applied when the initial 
decision was taken. It was rather suggested that it was a top-down decision, in which 
Member States did not realize the importance thereof before it was too late to change their 
minds.
177
 This should however not be seen as an excuse for Member States as they have 
the obligation to know what they are deciding upon before entering into negotiations. 
Nonetheless, not recognizing the array of different normative orders can make it difficult 
for the ECB to operate, as legal pluralism in the form of these different voices and opinions 
                                                 
173 See Appendix, Transcript of Interview with Benjamin Angel 
174 See Appendix: Transcript Interview with Benjamin Angel 
175 Germain 2012: 530 
176 See Appendix: Transcript Interview with Benjamin Angel 
177 See Appendix: Transcript Interview with Benjamin Angel 
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could have instead been used as a pragmatic technique of governance. By simply 
harmonizing norms and establishing legislation thereby giving specific powers to an 
institution, the EU risks forgoing the varied historic past and culture which are found 
within the Eurozone.  
Considering the institutional position for a globalization point of view, the ECB has been 
successful in its monetary policy. It has displayed a high level of competence in managing 
the financial crisis. As mentioned previously, taking into account the globalization process 
in terms of economic integration, the ECB has the possibility to stand as a watchdog
178
 
over both the financial system and the banking sector of the EU. In the appearance of an 
increasing impotence, failure, unwillingness or political cowardice of nation states, to act 
when presented with financial distress, a strong institution will grant the EMU more 
international credibility and security. Through its supranational position, the ECB will also 
be able to keep a distance from national or local interests, thereby also reducing the power 
of specific banks. Through the SSM, the ECB has the power to take charge of any bank, 
which Verhelst writes is “a pivotal element in the credibility of the SSM” and that “without 
such a provision, the ECB would not be able to exercise its final supervisory authority.”179 
As was highlighted in the interview with Charlotte Sickermann, the strength of the ECB 
and consequently the SSM is the strong European dimension. Unlike the EU-Council, it 
will be more difficult for the ECB to look at national interests, which enhances the chances 
that the ECB will be more successful. Additionally it was stressed in the interview that 
since national interests have previously not been a matter of concern for the ECB, the SSM 
will also adapt quickly to take on a European stance and thus a European view.  
Even though from a globalization perspective, there are advantages to having a common 
banking supervisor, there are also certain dangers that may come with it. Especially in 
regard to the ECB, there is a risk of reduced transparency, the process can impede political 
accountability and the ECB could be subject to capture by powerful interests. In terms of 
transparency we can consider the publications of the ECB on the SSM (see Table 6.2.) 
which clearly show that the ECB and the European Commission have published a lot of 
information on the SSM over the last two years. Even though there has been a lot of 
information published on the SSM, it would be beneficial to have more than a high number 
of publications on ECBs website. Considering that the SSM will start operating in just a 
few months, the ECB would be well advised to incorporate “banking supervision” in the 
                                                 
178 A term often used by Reuters 
179 Verhelst 2013: 19 
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section on their “tasks” in order to create more transparency and allow for participation of 
the general public, at least from an epistemological point of view. 
From an accountability perspective the ECB will officially be accountable to the EP and 
in-officially it will be accountable to a variety of independent actors in the form of 
domestic courts, international civil society and competing international regimes.
180
 As 
regards being accountable to the EP, a possible problem is that the EP has not yet managed 
to establish itself as a credible representative of all European citizens, which makes it 
difficult to see it as a “true watcher of European democracy.”181 Further, as highlighted by 
the Bundesbank Expert and in legal pluralism theory, the ECB can also be questioned 
before the ECJ as it will be applying EU law. This can be seen as giving both the ECB and 
the SSM a stronger backing, when decisions are in line with the rulings of the ECJ. As 
regards general accountability of the ECB, Angel expressed concerns about its 
accountability conscience. The topic of ECB’s accountability has already been extensively 
discussed
182
 and the ECB has been encouraged to be more open in terms of publishing 
formal and public records of their decision-making process.
183
 Arguments for more 
accountability in respect to the SSM concern possible mistakes which could occur in the 
supervisory process. If a mistake happens on an EU-level, citizens will continue to lose 
faith and feel misrepresented if they do not understand what is actually going on. 
Finally the concerns in regards to strengthening the ECB will be considered in respect to it 
being “subject to capture by powerful interests”. Both Germany and the UK have openly 
expressed their doubts on having the ECB as a supervisor: “German finmin184 signals: 
ready to compromise on banking union”185 and “UK opposes Mario Draghi role as 
watchdog”.186 While there seem to have been clearly expressed concerns about the power 
position of the ECB, Charlotte Sickermann expressed in her interview that the ECB is most 
likely not to play its power-card unless it is ultimately necessary. This was also written by 
Verhelst: “The ECB will have to dare to use its powers to claw back the delegation of 
supervision when it has doubts regarding a national supervisor’s actions.” The reason for 
toning down, the nonetheless obvious power position, would be the consequences that it 
could entail such as market unrests, transnational conflicts and the feeling of being treated 
                                                 
180 See 3.1. Legal Pluralism 
181 See Appendix Transcript of Interview Benjamin Angel 
182 Bini-Smaghi, Lorenzo & Daniel Gros. (2000). Open Issues in European Central Banking. United Kingdom: Palgrave 
and Macmillan; Mittermeier, Jana & Carl Dolan. (2012) Improving the accountability and transparency of the European 
Central Bank. Transparency International: the global coalition against corruption. 
183 Mittermaier & Dolan 2012: 3 
184 Finance Minister was shortened to Finmin by Financial Times 
185 Financial Times December 9, 2012 
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unfairly. This was also touched upon by the Bundesbank expert who said that, the system 
is strengthened as risk is reduced and a feeling of injustice
187
 will decrease. Especially 
since being lenient towards a specific Member State and/or bank would have huge 
implications for the framework. This aspect could potentially discipline both the ECB and 
Member States to act in accordance with the guidelines.
188
 
5.5. Are the European Member States189 ready for a European Banking Supervisor? 
When looking at the results from the media coverage data it becomes clear that the 
concerns which have been most frequently vocalized in all of the articles published within 
the last two years are those related to issues regarding Member States. A clear majority of 
48% of the articles have been written about matters such as “Divisions hamper Europe’s 
plan to tackle failing banks”190, “UK demands hold up on European banking union”191 or 
“Germany seeks to limit ECB role in banking union.”192 While the Member States cling to 
their status as sovereigns, it seems that they have not yet realized that notion of sovereignty 
has been transformed in regards to its traditional conception and construction. By creating 
a Single Market, the EU Member States did not only strengthen their worldwide impact in 
terms of economic and political significance, they also allowed the EU to emerge as a 
“regulatory state”193 with certain powers. These powers had until recently remained 
relatively limited which hindered the EU to take more action during the crisis. When 
considering the action that it did take, one can see that it is now being legally challenged 
by a Member State.
194
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Considering this from a legal pluralist perspective the various Member States in 
negotiation with the ECB have been forced to find common ground in terms of their hybrid 
legal spaces. In terms of the agreement on creating a Banking Supervision, it was a 
decision taken unanimously by the 28 Member States, after having consulted the EP and 
the ECB. It has been suggested, that this allows for greater equality of participations as a 
representation is “not simply to the unanimous opinions of its members but rather to 
structures of authority – to ‘multicultural jurisdictions’.”195 When the handbook for the 
SSM was being established it “was the result of a negotiation between the ECB and the 
national supervisors”196 which suggests that the concerns about the Supervision in regard 
to the Member States, is rather a concern of the Member States themselves. 
 
Differences in the national attitudes towards the SSM did not only become apparent when 
analyzing the articles which have been published over the last two years, but also when 
looking at the publications of the different NCBs. While some NCBs, such as France, 
Spain, Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy, all have been eager to publish a high amount 
of articles, press releases etc. two countries, Latvia and Luxembourg, did not publish 
anything at all. This shows a clear lack of transparency on national level for some countries 
even though it is the obligation and responsibility of national institutions to keep their 
citizens informed about undertakings on a supranational level which will come to affect 
them. Here it becomes especially apparent that the different legal spaces which exist in the 
EU are not only found on transnational level but can be found on national level, between 
governments, NCBs and NCAs, as well. 
The globalization theory expresses the importance of networking, especially when 
sovereigns transfer power from a national to a supranational level. That cooperation 
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between the ECB and the NCBs have in the past proven to be rather successful, can be 
taken from the statement by the ECB Expert who said that “the governance of the Euro 
system and the ESCB is often recognized to be smoother and more effective than that in 
other institutions.” Perhaps this is also an indication towards a reduced role of political 
power-plays in supervision and instead a call for incorporating legal pluralism without 
eliminating it. 
Actions by Member States, NCBs and national supervisors have however not always been 
an example for smooth sailing. During the crisis there were a number of situations in which 
either governments or national supervisors operated in a way which will become 
impossible through the introduction of the SSM. The case of Cyprus, where Cypriots 
bought Greek bonds in support of Greece due to their deep-rooted patriotism, shows that 
legal pluralism is not necessarily rational but it expresses beliefs and affiliations which are 
founded on tradition, history, patriotism etc. Such affiliations can be positive at times but 
when it comes to banking supervision, perhaps other norms should be considered and 
encouraged. The second case refers to the German supervisor freezing Lehman Brothers 
assets in the night of the collapse, without considering that allowing a transfer could have 
saved Lehman Brothers from collapsing.
197
 Both examples show that nation-based norms 
put the European financial system at risk and risk within the banking industry is contagious 
(as can be seen from the subsequent unraveling of the crisis). The argument that the author 
tries to make here, is that stepping up to defend national interests now, is not about 
defending legal pluralism and the historic past and culture of the individual Member States, 
but it is rather an attempt of trying to force legal centralism on others. 
As approximately 98% of the banks in the Eurozone will not meet the requirements 
necessary to be deemed significant enough to be supervised by the ECB, these banks will 
continue to be supervised on a national level.
198
 This division of power between the ECB 
and the NCBs can be seen as a creative way of embracing legal pluralism, especially as 
national supervision will be supported by JSTs. This will be a European team sent out by 
the ECB to help supervision on national level and make sure that national interests do not 
prevail. One other issue which remains in regard to national supervision is the decision of 
whether the NCB or the NCAs should be in charge (given that these are two separate 
entities). While 3 out of 5 NCBs are also in charge of supervision, 40% of the Member 
States have a supervisor which is separated from its NCB. While the freedom of allowing 
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these institutions to decide for themselves, who will be in charge of supervision, embracing 
the different cultures and traditions can be seen as recognizing legal pluralism as a 
pragmatic technique of governance. 
Through the process of globalization, internationalization of economic and social activity 
has taken place. While this means that the EU has gained in economic and political 
significance, it also makes individual countries more exposed to foreign dangers as could 
be seen by the effects of the global economic crisis which began in the USA but came to 
infect the EU with financial turmoil. In reference to Berman, who wrote that states have 
become impotent in face of global economy, it seems that this was also the case for some 
of the Member States during the crisis. Before the crisis Ireland was considered a sound 
country but when Anglo-Irish went into distress, the bank cost 40 points of GDP of debt 
for Ireland overnight.
199
 The support for the bank from a citizen point of view may have 
been in order in terms of democratic accountability, because, as Angel points out, “there 
was an Irish supervision, an Irish mistake and an Irish checkbook.”200 This was a few years 
ago but the citizens and the banks of the EU are not the same anymore. Citizens are tired of 
bailing out banks and even if the governments saw this as an option, banks have become 
too big to be rescued. 
Instead of continuously criticizing the structure of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and 
the Banking Union, it would be more effective and efficient for Member States to embrace 
and support it and thereby exert power and influence. Sweden, while not in the Eurozone, 
has been an active participant in the discussions on the SSM as they realized that their 
wishes and thoughts are more likely to be expressed if they act from within. According to 
one article, “the suspected improvement in the supervision of cross-border banking groups 
by the SSM would benefit Sweden as well.”201 This interconnectedness of decision-making 
is one of the benefits of the globalization process and the entailed system of networks 
allows for the expression of diversity. Throughout the process it is however important for 
both the ECB and the NCBs to remain honest and transparent about their actions as these 
aspects are key for a successful functioning of the system. 
The dangers of globalization and networking on Member State level are the same which 
were previously referred to in regard to institutions: reduced transparency, impede political 
accountability and being captured by powerful interests. While some countries have been 
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good in terms of transparency the Luxembourg and Belgian websites did not even clarify 
who was currently responsible for banking supervision on a national level. This is 
surprising considering that the ECB writes that “today, most central banks, including the 
ECB, consider transparency as crucial.”202 In terms of accountability it is important not to 
turn the EU, the ECB, the SSM and other supranational intuitions into scapegoats of their 
own national problems and mistakes. While the institutions are far from perfect, so are the 
Member States. The only way to improve either is through successful cooperation and 
taking own responsibility and responsibility for each other. Finally, in regards to being 
captured by powerful interests, the risk has been reduced for Member States through the 
act of granting power to the ECB. 
5.6. Would more time203 have been necessary to establish a successful supervision? 
When considering whether or not the creation of the SSM would have needed more time, it 
becomes apparent that the risks of not having a joint supervision, is one of the major 
reasons why it was established within such a short time. When considering the size of 
banks in the Eurozone, such as Deutsche Bank representing almost 60% of Germanys GDP 
or BNP Paribas accounting for 120% of the French GDP, it becomes clear that such large 
institutions cannot be saved by a single Member State. In line with the EU motto In 
vaerietate Concordia Europe faced the decision of whether to continue forward together or 
if they should fall apart. Having been forced to act without explicit competencies during 
the crisis, the EU and the ECB have now called for an increase in power to avoid the 
repetition of the same mistakes in future. Discussing legal pluralism within the realms of 
time-duration for the establishment of the mechanism is difficult as more negotiation time 
would not necessarily have improved the final outcome. Therefore the only thing worth 
mentioning is that there were differences in regard to when the mechanism should start 
operating, most notably from France and the Commission which supported a fast 
implementation and Germany which tried to push it back. 
From a globalization perspective there is an increasing global economic integration which 
continues to exist despite the crisis. As financial markets continue to operate and banks 
continue to grow and complete cross-border operations, it is impossible to assess what will 
be the next blow to financial stability and the European banking system. Considering that 
2/3 of European credit comes from banks, meaning that if the banks fall, then the whole 
                                                 
202 ECB (n/a) Transparency. European Central Bank. 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/transparency/html/index.en.html  
203 Than the two years of creation and implementation 
55 
 
economic activity of the EU falls, two years should not be seen as a short time to act. As 
can be seen from the most recent European bank failure in Portugal,
204
 Europe should be 
relieved that nothing more devastating has happened so far (even if the full consequences 
cannot yet be seized in their entirety). 
As regards the establishment of the mechanism in practical terms, the ECB has, in 
negotiation processes with NCAs, established a framework and outlined guidelines. EU, 
which has emerged as a regulatory state since the establishment of the Single Market is 
now gaining increasing power and real competencies to actually manage this role. In order 
to do so, the ECB has had to create a new department with staff specialized on oversight of 
financial institutions. They will have the task to supervise the Euro area banking system. 
The existence of language barriers was mentioned by the Bundesbank expert, who said that 
not all national supervisors are fluent in English. The question of English on an EU level, 
not always being easy, was addressed in an article in the Financial Times from May this 
year highlights this issue.
205
 In terms of transnational transparency it would be beneficial 
for the NCBs to at least offer some information on their websites in English, as well as in 
the national language(s) and also information on the soon to be implemented mechanism. 
However, only a few member states do offer this. It seems that the real time issue is not the 
need for more weeks, months or even years to negotiate what aspects should be 
incorporated into the mechanism, as no amount of time will be able to tell how the 
mechanism will work once it has been implemented. Instead the actual efforts made by the 
institutions and Member States will be the indicators of whether or not two years have 
been sufficient. Good organization and good logistics go a long way and could pave the 
way to success. 
5.7. Ethical Problems 
The topic of introducing a banking union and to establish a joint supervision is being 
intensely debated with most authors, commentators, experts and other contributors to the 
discourse choosing a firm side and sticking with it. As a scientific researcher, executing 
evaluation research, it is the authors’ duty and obligation to carefully consider arguments 
from both sides when assessing whether or not the SSM is anachronistic or perhaps the 
missing tool for a successful EMU. Fundamental values for autonomy, non-maleficence, 
beneficence and justice have been expressed as important factors to consider in regard to 
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research ethics.
206
 These values will be considered in terms of objectivity, anonymity and 
legal clearance. 
In terms of objectivity both quantitative and qualitative data were applied in order to 
provide a more balanced account of the situation. Although objectivity within the realms of 
social sciences is difficult to achieve, the topic was enlightened from both the institutional 
and the Member State perspectives while keeping in mind that both sides have obligations 
towards the European society and its citizens. In evaluating the establishment of the 
mechanism, the underlying aim was continuously to assess the best possible outcome for 
the citizens by applying scientific research. Respecting scientific conduct remained a high 
priority throughout the research process and the publication of results. 
The considerations of anonymity and legal clearance go hand-in-hand. In order to avoid 
“doing harm” to two of the interviewees by explicitly mentioning their names, their 
anonymity was guaranteed before the interviews were conducted. For the interview with 
the Bundesbank Expert, legal clearance of the entire interview would have been necessary. 
Although such legal clearance could have contributed to transparency, the time that it 
would have taken and the risk of certain aspects being deleted from the interview, led to 
the decision of not applying for such clearance. The reason of the Bundesbank insisting on 
this was that the opinions expressed by the Expert did not necessarily reflect the 
institution’s own views, but were rather the individual opinion of the expert. In order to 
remain autonomous throughout the interview process, the author decided to work 
autonomously and not to be limited in regard to which questions to ask and which answers 
to publish.  
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6. Conclusion 
The thesis set out to assess, using legal pluralism and globalization as theoretical 
foundations, and evaluation research as a methodological tool, if the ECB as a supervisory 
body in general, and the SSM in particular, could be considered anachronistic. This 
research question was answered through the application of theory on the three sub-
questions: 
 Are the European Union Institutions ready for a European Banking Supervisor? 
 Are the European Member States ready for a European Banking Supervisor? 
 Would more time have been necessary to establish a successful supervision? 
By answering these three questions using in-depth analysis, the paper found that, despite 
some concerns, the SSM mechanism and the project of joint supervision is in fact not 
anachronistic. This conclusion will be summarized in the critical assessment part, which 
outweighs the pros and cons as well as the suitability of the theory, method and materials. 
Finally a look into the future will be provided by suggestions on further research.  
7.1. Critical Assessment  
The financial crisis pushed the EU into some uncomfortable discussions, questioning if the 
Union would even be able to survive or if it had in fact reached its limits. Throughout 
Europe cries could be heard proclaiming the EU dead, newspaper headings called for less 
EU and more sovereignty and one Council meeting after the other tried to find solutions to 
a seemingly never ending amount of financial problems which quickly turned into 
political, social, legal and cultural concerns. As the EU governments were standing at the 
crossroads, the question which was hovering over their heads was “whether the legacy of 
this crisis [was] an integrated European banking system or a move back to 
fragmentation.”207 When trying to consider the options for the EU, it soon becomes clear 
that a joint supervision is the only possible solution to reduce systemic risks and cascading 
failures of financial institutions. This generated the aim of the paper, to assess if the 
planned supervision was to be created and implemented in 2014 and whether or not the 
institutions and Member States were ready.  
To summarize the findings, there are many aspects which speak for the SSM and joint 
supervision, such as it being a natural part of the globalization process and an innovative 
tool to strengthen the EUs position internationally. By granting powers to the ECB, which 
has operated successfully for almost two decades, the supervision will profit from entailed 
                                                 
207
 Véron 2011 
58 
 
international credibility and the strong European dimension. This reflects the globalization 
theory of nation-states losing importance and the need for innovative solutions. This 
position will also give the EU in general and the ECB in particular more exclusive 
competencies to act when necessary. Instead of continued impotence in the face of crisis at 
Member State level, the ECB, with its authority, high level of competence and recognized 
reputation on the financial markets, can be seen as the right institution for leading the euro 
area through this new journey of financial and economic integration. In the light of 
globalization, a strong institution with a European dimension has the possibility to 
supervise a number of financial institutions by applying networking between the different 
institutions. 
As the decision to create a common supervision and put the ECB in charge was based on 
unanimity, it started off with united Member State support - an important aspect of legal 
pluralism. Negotiations and unanimity can be seen as a sign of respecting differences and 
trying to incorporate them into the creation of a common supervision. The decision to 
apply unanimity shows that the Member States found a common ground to start with and 
cooperation between the ECB and the NCBs has so far been successful. Due to the 
European dimension of the supervision, the political power-play between Member States 
will be reduced on a transnational level - an aspect which is related to globalization and the 
danger of being captured by powerful interests. The distance of the ECB to local interests 
will also hinder the supervision to be caught up by non-decisive factors when executing 
supervision. In order to keep some of the national features, the NCAs will, in line with the 
provisions, continue with supervision on national level. The applicability of EU law and its 
supremacy over national law further grounds the European dimension and is aimed at 
disciplining the ECB and Member States alike, all of which can be challenged before the 
ECJ. These aspects directly address concerns of transparency, accountability and powerful 
interests. 
On the other side of the argument, certain aspects must be acknowledged and incorporated 
into supervision, in order to allow it to operate to the best of its abilities. As regards 
Member States concerns as well as the concerns on a national level, these issues should not 
be ignored but rather addressed in order to secure the support of all Member States. In this 
way, the change of generating an optimal input of voices and considerations can be 
achieved by embracing legal pluralism. Complaints about something which will become 
reality within the next few months are not going to be fruitful but just risk negatively 
influencing the start of the supervision instead of providing it the best possible support. 
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Taking into consideration that the markets have been calm for far too long and the 
geopolitical uncertainties which are increasing by the day, the European Member States 
should rather embrace a strong union rather than a weak fragmented one. By respecting the 
existence of differences on both a supranational level and a national level, thereby 
embracing legal pluralism, the mechanism could be further strengthened as it would 
acknowledge its weaknesses. While discussions leading up to the agreement should 
perhaps have been more inclusive, negotiations between different actors were incorporated 
into the negotiations once the decision had been taken. In future different norms should, 
however, be respected in order to create a smooth functioning of the mechanism. By 
simply ignoring these issues, they will not be eradicated but rather risk coming back in a 
more severe form. Another weakness which should be addressed as regards globalization is 
the problem of accountability. As the ECB is accountable to the EP, which is supposed to 
represent the citizens of the Union, it can be questioned whether this is a true 
representation of the citizens and thus an effective institution to be accountable to. 
Having assessed both sides, it becomes clear that a general feeling of doubt and negativity 
should not dictate the future of integration. The EU was founded to promote peace and 
stability, aspects which have both been challenged through the sovereign debt crisis. In an 
attempt to reestablish these pillars, the supervision is aimed at reducing national bias in 
favor of a Union-wide stability. In order to avoid using taxpayers to bail out banks and 
before something worse happens, it is better to embrace the supervision and make the best 
of it. As was highlighted by Berman, law it “is an ongoing process of articulation, 
adaptation, rearticulation, absorption, resistance, [and] deployment” thus “scholars and 
policy-makers would do well to study the multiplicity and engage in conversation, rather 
than impose a top-down framework that cannot help but distort the astonishing variety on 
the ground.”208 In order to avoid such a top-down framework, interaction by the 
institutions and the Member States should be encouraged. The only way to improve is 
through successful cooperation, recognizing one’s own responsibilities and taking 
responsibility for each other.  
By applying legal pluralism and globalization, the author was able to move the topic of 
European supervision into a socio-legal discourse. The classic mistake of evaluation 
research and low methodological standards due to poorly resourced evaluations was 
addressed by incorporating a variety of different methods for gathering relevant 
information. As such evaluations are usually not concerned with academic understanding, 
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this paper has set out to explicitly express both academic as well as non-academic aspects 
in order to provide a comprehensive assessment. The proposed suggestions should be 
acknowledged when implementing the mechanism and executing supervision for two 
reasons. First, in order to guarantee that supervision is operating to the best of its abilities 
in socio-legal terms, these suggestions will be indispensable. Second, as the ECB is 
embarking on a new journey of a worldwide unprecedented challenger, every consideration 
which can contribute to a successful operation between the various hybrid legal spaces 
should be taken into account. 
6.2. Further Research 
Looking into the future, other aspects which would have been both relevant and interesting 
from a Sociology of Law perspective include the morality and reason aspects, the choice of 
legal base and concerns regarding the intensification of a “two-speed Europe” and thus a 
Europe with citoyen de seconde zone. The morality-reason aspect would have evaluated 
the power situation and implications of granting the ECB supervisory powers. The 
question on the legal base involves doubts of whether or not the treaties provide for the 
establishment of a supervisor, if the ECB is legally allowed to function as a supervisor and 
if not a different legal base and thus an agency would have been a better choice. Lastly the 
worries about a “two-speed Europe” relates to concerns about the intensification of the 
Eurozone and its Member States, while other Member States are moving in a 
different/slower direction. However, retrieving and accessing the relevant information 
would, however, have exceeded the means available for this master’s thesis. Instead, this 
author calls for further research in this field. 
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Appendix I. 
Questions for the Commission April 3
rd
 2014 
Master Thesis Subject 
The Thesis is written within the course Sociology of European Law at the University of 
Lund. The main aim of the thesis is to explore which effects the Banking Supervision will 
have for the European society. As the Eurozone countries will become more integrated due 
to the Banking Supervision, non-Eurozone countries run the risk of further distancing 
themselves from the countries united by a common currency and supervisory authority. 
Questions 
Historical Developments of Central Banks 
 Historically central banks have changed in regards to their competencies: would 
you say that a banking supervision by the Eurozone central banks in general and the 
ECB in particular can be considered a natural part of this development? 
 Padoa-Schioppa said in 1999 „Over time such a mode will have to be structured to 
the point of providing the banking industry with a true and effective collective euro 
area supervisor. “209 Should/Could a banking supervision thus have been 
established earlier? 
Banking Union/ Banking Supervision (and SSM) 
 Do you believe that the SSM can be used as a model for other central banks 
globally? 
 The European sovereign debt crisis was partially fostered through the discrepancies 
between EU Member States and the varying degrees of Banking Supervision within 
them. If one would compare the Banking Supervision and the Stability and Growth 
Pact (on the common denominator that they are both frameworks incorporating the 
financial aspects of a number of different countries and cultures) what lessons can 
be learned from the mistakes of the SGP? 
 Within the European integration theory there exists the theory of deepening210 
which has the aim of bringing the people of Europe closer together, as was outlined 
in the preamble of the TFEU. Some of the older EU-countries have already decided 
against adopting the Euro, additionally countries are choosing not to be supervised 
by the Banking Supervision: does this mean that the distance between the countries 
will increase?  
 When member states which have not yet adopted the Euro, adopt the euro, will the 
automatically fall under the SSM/ Banking Supervision? 
 Would it be useful for these countries to implement the single supervisory 
mechanism in order to circumvent banking crises?  
                                                 
209 Sprenger, Martin. (2013). The European Banking Union: Origins, state of play and way forward.  
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/events/2013/nineteenth_annual_capital_markets/sprenger.pdf  
210 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/deepening_european_integration_en.htm  
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 According to the Financial Stability Review November 2013 published by the 
ECB, a catalogue has been established, which summarizes as aspects which will be 
supervised by the SSM. How have these aspects been identified and incorporated? 
The Role of the Commission 
 In 2012 the Commission released a statement on the Banking Supervision, stating 
that:  
Different supervisory handbooks and supervisory approaches between the Member States 
participating in the single supervisory mechanism and the other Member States pose a 
risk of fragmentation of the single market, as banks could exploit the differences to 
pursue regulatory arbitrage.
211
 
How is it possible to create a handbook which incorporates all the aspects 
of the various banks? 
 On what basis did the Commission propose a European banking 
supervision? 
European Society 
 Would you say that the Banking Supervision is a natural step in the European 
integration process and that it is necessary in order to “lay the foundations of an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe“212? 
 It is often accentuated, that the banking supervision aims to break the close bond 
between states and banks; what impact would this have on the society in general? 
 Just as the European Society is made up of an array of cultures and traditions, so 
are the European banks. In how far have these cultural differences been considered 
in the construction of a European Banking Supervision?  
                                                 
211 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52012DC0510:EN:NOT  
212 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN  
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Transcript of Interviews 
 
Interview with: Charlotte Sickermann DG Internal Market and Services 
   Unit 02- Financial Services Policy, Relations with the Council 
   3
rd
 of April 2014 
   Interview time: 40min35 
 
Louise Mansson: So I send you the questions beforehand, so I will just start from the 
beginning. 
Historically central banks have changed do you believe that this is now a natural part of the 
development of central banks? Was a supervisory task bound to be incorporated in central 
banks or is it something out of the ordinary? 
Charlotte Sickermann: I am not sure it has changed, as already before many banks had 
supervisory responsibilities. It evolved, for instance in the UK, the Bank of England was in 
charge of banking supervision. Then they established the FSA (about 10 years ago) and 
now the Bank of England is again part of supervision. The responsibility is partly natural, 
having central banks in charge of supervision because they are closely connected to the 
banking sector and have a thorough understanding of what is going on in the banking 
sector. So it makes sense from that perspective. 
But of course, you talked to the Bundesbank so I am pretty sure that they also talked about 
some possible problems of being a central bank and being involved in banking supervision 
at the same time. In conclusion, there are good arguments and synergies for it, but there are 
also arguments against it- it’s a cyclical thing. Now there is a trend of giving supervision 
back to central banks, but in ten years things might change. 
Louise Mansson: Ok. Mr. Padoa-Schioppa said in 1999 „Over time such a mode will have 
to be structured to the point of providing the banking industry with a true and effective 
collective euro area supervisor. “213 Do you think this was already predicting that there 
should be a supervisory body and maybe it should have been implemented before? 
Charlotte Sickermann: I am sure that he was partly predicting it. If you look at the Treaty 
we have the legal basis to confer such powers to the ECB. I mean people thought of it 
before hand. So I mean it was already discussed at some point when establishing the EMU. 
It is about how Europe works, you can only progress further or deepen the Union in terms 
of crisis- as joint supervision is also a question of national sovereignty and it is difficult for 
Member States to surrender or give supervision to a European institution.  
                                                 
213 Sprenger, Martin. (2013). The European Banking Union: Origins, state of play and way forward.  
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/others/events/2013/nineteenth_annual_capital_markets/sprenger.pdf  
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Ideally we should have done it. With the knowledge we have today, of course we should 
have done it. You couldn’t predict the crisis and I think that it would have been impossible 
ten years ago. At that time we were still in a very national system for banking system, so it 
would have been too early. In a perfect world we would have done it. 
Louise Mansson: You said it is hard for NCB to give powers to the ECB and an EU level. 
With the banking supervision we will also have supervisory powers both with the ECB and 
the NCBs, how do you think the different bodies will deal with this power structure? Do 
you think that they will try to focus on the ECB, as standing above them, or do you think 
they will try to let their muscles play? 
Charlotte Sickermann: It is a system; it is modelled very much in parallel to the way 
monetary policy is conducted. You have both a European and a national dimension, with 
the national supervisors. What is important for the SSM is that the ECB has responsibilities 
for the whole banking sector. So it is true that the ECB will only directly supervise the 
biggest banks from the start, but it has the responsibility for the whole sector. 
The ECB also has the right to take over supervision of any bank at any point in time. So if 
the ECB detects a problem with one bank it can take over. This disciplines the ECB to look 
at the whole system and not only focus on the biggest banks, but it will also disciple many 
national supervisors to act within the guidance given by the ECB. If the NCBs/NCAs do 
not do a good job, then the ECB will take over. It will thus discipline the different 
institutions to carry out strong and solid supervision. It will discipline both on a 
supranational and national level, to make sure that both sides work together and have the 
same interests.  
Louise Mansson: The framework regulation says that, before the ECB takes over a national 
bank, they have to give “heads up” to the NCBs. This reminded me of the Commission 
which has the power to enter certain organizations, or companies when they suspect 
misconduct. Is this a similar approach? 
Charlotte Sickermann: I would not see it that formulistic. In any case, the possibility for 
the ECB to take over is what we always call a “nuclear-option”. This is really the worse-
case scenario and normally it should never come to this. The ECB has many rights already 
beforehand: it can request information at any point in time (which they will do to have an 
understanding of what is going on), the ECB will be able to give general guidance on how 
to carry out supervision, the ECB will develop a supervisory manual which gives clear 
instructions on the processes and finally, NCAs will have to send major decisions to the 
ECB either ex ante or ex post. So the ECB has many possibilities to get insight information 
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and be informed. Then it would formally inform that they want to take over, at that point 
they will already have all the necessary information and will no longer “start” 
investigation. This is also for the ECB decide how they will do this. 
Louise Mansson: Do you believe that the SSM can be used as a model for other central 
banks globally? 
Charlotte Sickermann: I don’t think that the SSM as such can be applied to other countries, 
as it is specifically designed for Europe. It is a specific case where you have independent 
Member States working together and the whole Board-Structure… In terms of the Board-
Structure I am not convinced that it is necessarily the most efficient one. 
We have a very large supervisory Board as there are 28 Member States but with a 
European dimension. We have a steering committee which will be much leaner, which also 
has an important role to play. But I would recommend a smaller decision-making body in 
general. So from that point I wouldn’t see it as a model. Of course the idea of having a 
central bank entrusted with banking supervision and having a decentralized system of 
banking supervision makes sense. But as this is how it is done in most countries anyway. 
(08:15:12) 
Louise Mansson: The European sovereign debt crisis was partially fostered through the 
discrepancies between EU Member States and the varying degrees of Banking Supervision 
within them. If one would compare the Banking Supervision and the Stability and Growth 
Pact (on the common denominator that they are both frameworks incorporating the 
financial aspects of a number of different countries and cultures) what lessons can be 
learned from the mistakes of the SGP? 
Charlotte Sickermann: Well, I mean the main lesson which can be learned from the SGP is 
that we didn’t really, or better said couldn’t, enforce it. There were strong interests against 
enforcing it, the moment something went wrong. It is difficult to compare them, they are 
very different. What is different is that the ECB or the SSM has a very strong European 
dimension. Within the JST you have five members from the ECB which will look at the 
European interests and not at the national interests. This will already make it more difficult 
for the supervisory board to act in the way the council did in the example of the SGP.  
I think this is the main difference and of course the ECB can take over supervision at any 
point. So far, if we consider the monetary policy which has been carried out, we didn’t 
have any of the problems that we had within the Council. So you can see that the system 
adapts quite quickly to have a European stance and take a European view. So I wouldn’t be 
too concerned. Especially since acting out of national interests would have huge 
70 
 
implications for the ECB, so the ECB will do everything they can not to be perceived as 
acting in national interests. If the ECB is too lenient on one country or towards certain 
banks it will have huge implications. It will have financial implications, damage its 
reputation, have effects on its monetary policy… so I think everyone has an interest for the 
ECB to be strong and allow them to carry out supervision.  
But we will have to see. It will take some time for the system to develop. In the long term 
NCAs should not see themselves as national supervisors but as part of the SSM.   
Louise Mansson: This comparison between the ECB and the Council brings me to another 
question: It is often accentuated, that the banking supervision aims to break the close bond 
between states and banks; what impact would this have on the society in general? Will the 
ECB be more neutral and therefore break the bond? 
Charlotte Sickermann: Yes. The problem which we had in the past, also in banking 
supervision, which is why I must say it was so reluctant to move supervision to a European 
level, was that of course it is used to create national champions. It is this idea of creating 
big strong banks. So supervisors were not objective. Whereas the ECB will not defend 
national interests, although there is of course the risk that the ECB will defend European 
interests and will want to have European champions in a way. But this would nevertheless 
detangle the relationship between banks and governments.  
Louise Mansson: Within the European integration theory there exists the theory of 
deepening
214
 which has the aim of bringing the people of Europe closer together, as was 
outlined in the preamble of the TFEU. Some of the older EU-countries have already 
decided against adopting the Euro, additionally countries are choosing not to be supervised 
by the Banking Supervision: does this mean that the distance between the countries will 
increase?  
Charlotte Sickermann: Of course there is a certain risk that this happens and we cannot 
pretend that there isn’t. In our view, this is more of a short-/medium-term problem, 
because in the long-term almost all Member States have to adopt the euro. When you then 
adopt the euro you also fall under the umbrella of banking supervision as it is mandatory 
for Euro area Member States. 
Of course this leaves us with the UK and Denmark, Sweden also, but they will have to 
adopt the Euro. They will find ways to get around it, but in the long-term they are expected 
to do it. I think in the long-term we will not have this problem very much as it will solve 
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itself. In the short-/medium-term we will have to make sure that internal market is not 
impaired by the banking union. 
To do this we have the EBA which is quite important and will become more important in 
that area. Maybe we also have to distinguish between regulation and supervision. The 
regulation and the regulatory framework applies to all 28 Member States and then the ECB 
as a supervisor, which will apply to European level for the Euro area and other 
participating Member States. The EBA will make sure that there is appropriate 
coordination between different supervisors within the EU. So it could work, but it is 
important that we keep a look at this.  
Louise Mansson: This already answers a little bit of the next question: Would it be useful 
for these countries to implement the SSM in order to circumvent banking crises but also to 
prepare for what is coming?  
Charlotte Sickermann: Yes. In our view yes of course! It would only be useful to be there 
now, because now the SSM is being built and you could influence how it will look. If you 
wait for ten years the whole system will already be settled and you would just have to take 
it as it is and you wouldn’t have any choice. The banking sector for many Eastern 
European countries is dominated by the banks from Western Europe. This already now 
puts them in a difficult position because they need to deal with their home-authority and 
the home-authorities of Western countries. This requires lot of coordination as the home-
authority, e.g. Germany, will look at what is happening in Germany.  
So in that sense, if they are part of the SSM, they will be part of the supervisor directly and 
they can protect their interests or at least make sure that there interest is being taken into 
account.
215
 So far various reasons it may be useful for them, but for political reasons they 
may not want to do it. They would be giving a lot of authority to the European level and no 
Member States likes to do this. But it could help to avoid banking crisis and avoid 
coordination issues.  
Louise Mansson: According to the Financial Stability Review November 2013 published 
by the ECB, a catalogue has been established, which summarizes as aspects which will be 
supervised by the SSM. How have these aspects been identified and incorporated? 
Charlotte Sickermann: This is the basic principle of banking supervision: it needs to be 
proportionate and you need to take diversity of business models into account. Already in 
                                                 
215 As the thesis is written Bulgaria has started talks with ECB to join Supervision: Tsolova, Tsvetelia. (2014) “Bulgaria 
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the CRD-package there was a segment on this and it was also added to the SSM regulation. 
In the SSM regulation you also have all of the criteria on which banks fall directly under 
the ECB supervision and which will be supervised by NCAs. What the ECB will do, is 
they will draw up a manual which will be very general and basically focus on the 
processes. Since the smaller banks, which have very different business models, will 
anyways be supervised by local supervisors. This already exists in supervision and will not 
change very much. 
Louise Mansson: In 2012 the Commission released a statement on the Banking 
Supervision, stating that:  
Different supervisory handbooks and supervisory approaches between the Member States 
participating in the single supervisory mechanism and the other Member States pose a risk 
of fragmentation of the single market, as banks could exploit the differences to pursue 
regulatory arbitrage.
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How is it possible to create a handbook which incorporates all the aspects of the 
various banks? 
 
Charlotte Sickermann: It is challenging. Maybe in order to clarify, because I think there are 
two processes going on. There is the ECB working on the manual (which will focus on 
process, procedures, who is in charge of what etc.) and then you have the EBA working in 
parallel of a supervisory handbook, which is the reference you make here. 
This will be carried out by the EBA, which makes sure that it is not only applied to the 
Euro area but to the whole EU. This brings us back to the point about the potential risks to 
split the EU in two. This will be addressed here. Of course this is a huge project and it is 
not going to be a short handbook. In fact it will be quite long. But I think what the 
handbook will do is focus on big and complex banks, using internal models because these 
are the banks which directly compete with each other. The smaller banks, which in most 
cases only use standard models; there won’t be much about this in the handbook. If you 
use the standard approach under the CRD you don’t have much choice on the weigh your 
assets, calculate your capital requirements etc. also to keep it simple for these banks. So for 
them it is less important to have such a handbook. 
Of course it will also give some guidance to supervisors to make sure they have the same 
standards and that they apply the same standards. These can however remain rather general 
and you do not need to go into detail as it is more about the way to carry out supervision, 
risk assessment etc. which you can do at the top level. 
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Louise Mansson: On what basis did the Commission propose a European banking 
supervision? 
 
Charlotte Sickermann: We started working on this project in April 2012 when the whole 
discussion about the Banking Union started to get momentum. I think the IMF mentioned 
it and the ECB and then there was this famous Council meeting in June, where the 
European Council asked the Commission to come up with a proposal using Article 
127(6)
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 as a legal basis. So we did not really have much choice on which Article to base 
supervision and who should be entrusted with it, as this was already given. 
Of course the Commission has the right to initiative but if we get a request from the 
Council and we make a proposal going in the complete opposite direction, especially given 
the urgency of the situation it would not have very helpful. That was the basis on which we 
worked and from which we developed the proposal. 
We thus made a proposal in September, based on the guidance given by the European 
Council. Then we started negotiations with Member States, there we had three or four 
Member States proposal. Given the urgency and the fact that we needed to have unanimity 
we had to change quite a lot so that everybody could live with it and could agree to it. 
Louise Mansson: Do you think that it that the outcome was as strong as intended, or do you 
think it was weakened considerably during the negotiation process?  
Charlotte Sickermann: Overall it kept its strength, of course some areas have been 
weakened but from the outset it had been kept rather general. The idea behind this was to 
be flexible and keep flexibility to accommodate for future developments. So we did not 
have the distribution of work between the ECB, NCBs and NCAs. We said everything 
should go to the ECB knowing that the ECB would not do everything but would distribute 
power to the national level. But we wanted to give the ECB the flexibility to decide how to 
do this best and adjust the system in the future. You need unanimity therefore you need 28 
Member States to incorporate all the wished of the Member States. This was during the 
crisis, so all the Member States were flexible, but if it needs to be changed this will be 
done in a normal situation. This is why we kept it shorter and more general and did not 
spell out everything explicitly. 
One area where the text was weakened, I think, would be in the area of macro-prudential 
tasks as we had suggested the ECB should take over all powers of macro-prudential 
authority. This was significantly weakened. It was weakened in some areas but what not 
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over-all weakened. This is also the purpose of negotiations: we make some errors and 
don’t take into consideration everything, so it is helpful to negotiate and clarify.  
Louise Mansson: Would you say that the Banking Supervision is a natural step in the 
European integration process and that it is necessary in order to “lay the foundations of an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe“218? 
Charlotte Sickermann: Yes I would think so. We already discussed this before. But what I 
mean is that during the crisis we thought that European Union was missing an important 
element. Moving to banking supervision is a very big step: it is similar to introducing the 
euro. You give a lot of sovereignty to a European level and banks are essential for the 
economy. So it can be seen as a big step for furthering integration, also to make the Euro 
area and the EMU more sustainable in long term. During the crisis we had the choice of 
going for more integration or going into the opposite direction and luckily we chose to 
have more integration. 
Louise Mansson: It is often accentuated, that the banking supervision aims to break the 
close bond between states and banks; what impact would this have on the society in 
general? 
Charlotte Sickermann: I would say that this will have many positive aspects for the society. 
During the crisis we had the problem that many banks had to be bailed out by governments 
and in the end tax payers had to pay for it. So if you manage to break this close link, this is 
not only done by the banking union but also the reform initiatives (see Bank Recovery 
Resolution Directive
219
 etc.), in this way we will make sure that banks are no longer bailed 
out by governments anymore. 
Louise Mansson: You mean this will only the last resort? 
Charlotte Sickermann: In the very last resort. But there we have quite strict rules outlining 
on how and when the governments can step in, under what conditions and also the state-aid 
working parallel. So there will be very strict conditions. In general this will help a lot, but 
of course you need a final backstop. In general this will help a lot because tax payers will 
not have to bail out banks in the future, which will help all of us.  
Louise Mansson: Just as the European Society is made up of an array of cultures and 
traditions, so are the European banks. In how far have these cultural differences been 
considered in the construction of a European Banking Supervision? 
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Charlotte Sickermann: What we have in the SSM regulation is that there should be an 
exchange of staff between the supervisors. The cultural differences are not mentioned 
explicitly but it should be taken into account that we have the exchange of staff and that we 
have the principal that supervisors’ should take into account the differences. So this is also 
part of the cultural difference aspect. We try to accommodate for this and we are aware 
that there are cultural differences, but I don’t think we have something else. 
I think that overtime you will have people at the ECB working together who used to work 
on a national level and then they are working at a European level. This will not always be 
easy and there will be different supervisory approaches and cultures but overtime they will 
converge. This will then also spill-over to national supervision, even if it takes time and 
some cultural diversity will remain. The existence of cultural differences is also a positive 
thing, it is enriching. Also at the Commission we are working with different backgrounds 
and different thinking and this is very positive. You get different ideas and more input so I 
would see it as a positive thing which should be maintained.  
Louise Mansson: How important is it that the Banking Union and Supervision is successful 
for the cititzens? 
Charlotte Sickermann: I think it is very important. If it is not successful and if we do not 
manage to overcome the tendency to protect our national system, then the whole economy 
will collapse. I mean leaving the Euro would be expensive for all of us. It would also be a 
big step back in terms of integration; it would be costly in economic terms but also as a 
normal citizen. Perhaps this is the problem of the EU- that as a normal citizen you do not 
realize the benefits. You live day by day with the benefits, but going would also be quite a 
change. Now you are used to travel with one currency, compare prices, you can work 
wherever you want in Europe… Going back would have quit a strong impact on all the 
citizens.  
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Louise Mansson: First I will consider the historical developments of central banks in 
general, in this regard I was asking: Historically central banks have changed in regards to 
their competencies. Would you say that a banking supervision by the ECB and the NCBs 
can be considered a natural part of the development of central banks? 
Benjamin Angel: You start with a difficult question. First, there was no natural model in 
regard to supervision in Europe. Some countries had supervision done by the central banks, 
while others did not. The funny thing was that, with the crisis, countries which had not 
entrusted supervision with the central banks had reformed it to entrust supervision with the 
central banks, while the other countries which had entrusted supervision with the central 
banks, made reforms to have supervision done by another body. Basically, everyone was 
unhappy with the way supervision had developed, which was very much independent of 
what body was in charge. 
Some surveys have been done by academics, regarding whether it is good or bad to have 
supervision entrusted to the central banks. The main pro is that central banks will pay more 
attention to liquidity problems than more traditional supervisors, which focus more clearly 
on solvency. This is a natural development in central banks- to provide liquidity support. 
The fact that they pay more attention to liquidity sometimes means that they can act more 
quickly before liquidity problems turn into solvency issues- there is a thin line between 
these two. Thus, in this respect it is not bad to have a central bank in charge. 
Now as far as the EU overall is concerned, the Treaty was ambiguous. Article 127(6) 
mentions the possibility to entrust tasks related to supervision to the ECB, which does not 
necessarily point to entrusting the supervision to the ECB; but rather some aspects. 
Most likely, without the crisis, we would never have moved to central supervision. I also 
participated in the first package, five years ago when we created the European supervisory 
authority. At that time, it took a considerable effort to convince people to change 
supervisory information. The idea that you could move to a common supervisor was pure 
science fiction. So it took a really big crisis for people to be convinced to take such a step. 
Should it be the ECB or not the ECB? The initial preference of the Commission was 
certainly not the ECB. We would have preferred to entrust an independent agency for 
many reasons. One aspect is related to the choice of legal basis, we would have preferred 
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to use Article 114 and the entailed qualified majority rather than unanimity requirement 
which is always a bit of Russian roulette on a European level with 28 Member States. We 
were also afraid to make the already almighty ECB even more powerful against the 
background, where the ECB is not always cooperative. This is fine for monetary policy 
which is independently protected by the Treaty but it is less fine for supervision for which 
you need a high level of cooperation, treasuries and things like this. 
Nonetheless the ECB managed, at a Council meeting, to extract references to a European 
Council conclusion under Article 127(6) for creating supervision thereby convincing the 
heads of states that the ECB would be most suited for this position even though different 
options were still being considered. While this was one of the options, it was not the 
favorite option of the Commission. Consequently the action papers were scaled down to 
one, and the ECB was kept as the only option. 
Louise Mansson: In 1999 Padoa-Schioppa „Over time such a mode will have to be 
structured to the point of providing the banking industry with a true and effective collective 
euro area supervisor.“220 Should/Could a banking supervision thus have been established 
earlier? 
Benjamin Angel: You can find statements from everyone on everything, so one can be 
sure, especially in economy, that when you predict a recession or a strong growth one day 
you will be right. In the long term this could have been an option but Padoa-Schioppa did 
not have any influence on this process. 
It is really the crisis itself as well as the expected advantages of entrusting the ECB that has 
made the difference: some visible and some invisible. I could explain if you are interested. 
Louise Mansson: Yes, I would very much like to hear the explanation. 
Benjamin Angel: One the visible and obvious part, entrusting the ECB considerably 
reduces the risk of supervisory capture. Let me explain using two examples: 
1) Ireland was a perfectly sound country, which was killed by its banking sector. In 
2008, which was an interesting year for the EU, because it was the year when the financial 
crisis started to cross the Atlantic and we lost the illusion that problems are just for the 
Americans and we ourselves will be much safer. It would have been the year in which you 
could have expected very active supervisory activity. For the whole year, the whole year, 
the Irish supervisor only made two inspections and took zero decisions. Not that they were 
stupid, but they were completely captured by the environment. 
2) Even more spectacular is the case of Cyprus. I do not know if you have been to 
Cyprus, but the Cypriots feel Greek, you even see more Greek flags than you see Cypriote 
flags. When Greece started to have troubles, they wanted to show Greece solidarity by 
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buying Greek bonds. The supervisor shared this feeling of solidarity and did nothing to 
stop the Cypriote banks from building a huge exposure to Greek government bonds. He 
also wanted to help- which means that if we want to go to the restructuring of Greek debt 
there is a wall of Cypriote banking system that can collapse. 
This can only happen when supervision is done on national level. It is clear that when you 
have a supervisor sitting in Frankfurt, he would have blown the whistle and said “Stop!” 
well before. He would never have let this huge excessive exposure to only one category of 
asset being built up. 
It makes the system much safer because it creates a very strong distance between local 
interests and the decision-making center. This is the first advantage. 
The second advantage, it can help somehow reigniting a normal functioning of the internal 
market. We have seen in this crisis a lot of ring fencing behavior of the supervisors. That 
is, the supervisor trying to do what they can do protect their own market, thereby not 
paying attention to the possible effects this can have on the others. This even happened in 
the first minute of the crisis in Europe: the night when Lehman Brothers collapsed the 
German supervisors immediately froze all assets of Lehman in Germany not even thinking 
for one minute, that transferring some assets to the UK which could have saved part 
Lehman in the UK.  
You cannot blame the German supervisor, because the mission of the national supervisor 
was to protect the national market. More recently, we have seen supervisors such as the 
German and the Austrian ones trying to prevent UniCredit from transferring profits from 
its German and Austrian activities to Italy. So Unicredit which is a truly integrated bank, 
was somehow prevented by national supervisors acting to protect their all-national 
backyard, to operate as a normal European bank moving profits. This is not possible when 
you have a national supervisor as the decision, by definition will be taken on a central level 
in Frankfurt. Thus moving profits from Austria to Italy, is neither better nor worse.  
Louise Mansson: So this means that European integration is enhanced? 
Benjamin Angel: Yes exactly. Those two advantages are visible. There is however the 
problem that the ECB now has two responsibilities. If you look at the Treaty the primacy 
should go to price stability that is the target of the ECB. 
Louise Mansson: Is there a risk of inefficiency due to the large board?  
Benjamin Angel: To soon to judge: in my experience number is not an issue as long as a) 
you have clear rules and b) you have someone heading the system committed to using 
those rules. If you have a body of 25 people looking for consensus, that’s hell. If you have 
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a body with 25 people, working with simple majority, and someone sharing it saying “you 
disagree, now let us vote!” then it works. 
So we will see, then Nouy is a very tough personality. So I would assume that in term of 
profile that is rather the right profile because she is not exactly a consensus-builder but 
rather someone who goes straight to the point, trying to extract decisions as quickly as 
possible. 
Obviously you still have a lot of friction and tension. Obviously the German, the French, 
the Italian are all trying to protect their interest and protect their markets, it is not that bad 
as it was to be expected and should be seen as a normal process when constructing a 
supervisory authority.  
The real task will be when we have a real problem of cross-border banks. That will be the 
worst case, but more for the ECB than for the resolution authority.  
Louise Mansson: Could the SSM work as a model for other countries, in the long-term 
future? 
Benjamin Angel: Sharing a supervisor is an extremely big step, because it is not about just 
sharing a supervisor but ultimately it is also about sharing the consequences of mistakes. 
That is why we had to complement the ECB with the SRM and the common fund. At this 
means that we are back at the participating states, which means that it is nearly as big a 
step as sharing a currency which no other group of countries in the world has done yet. So 
I cannot think of a single case where things would be ready, for such a step. Apart from the 
countries which are already in monetary union, like the African countries.  
It is quite a step. And it is a step which was taken relatively quickly if you take the long 
view. It has taken more than a century to get there. 
Louise Mansson: The European sovereign debt crisis was partially fostered through the 
discrepancies between EU Member States and the varying degrees of Banking Supervision 
within them. If one would compare the Banking Supervision and the Stability and Growth 
Pact (on the common denominator that they are both frameworks incorporating the 
financial aspects of a number of different countries and cultures) what lessons can be 
learned from the mistakes of the SGP? 
Benjamin Angel: I will be blunt with you. I am not sure that this comparison makes any 
sense.  
Louise Mansson: That’s ok. 
Benjamin Angel: The SGP is a set of common rules, essentially a set of “don’ts” not 
“does” and it has nothing to do with daily supervision of a bank. The “don’ts” in the SGP 
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framework are binding while the does in the fiscal coordination framework were none 
binding. When you go to common supervision, the ECB as supervisor can take any 
decision on banking there is. It can call on the banks that are in its responsibility as well as 
the banks which are not in its direct responsibility. So it has the power to press the buttons 
and do the nitty-gritty.  
The only common point between the two is that we are facing the same problem of 
democratic responsibility. In the SGP and fiscal coordination framework, the reforms that 
we have done in the last year in particular have gone extremely far. For instance: now 
Member States have to submit a draft budget to the Commission, and the Commission has 
the power to force resubmission. That would have been science fiction as well.  
If you compare it to the US, the US does not have the power to force resubmission of 
California, Arizona or whichever state. We have this power. It is a huge power. But clearly 
we are touching here the heart of the historic accountancy of national parliaments. When 
we deal with supervision on a European level, we are also dealing with something which 
can have gigantic effects on the Member States.  
I mentioned Ireland in the beginning of this interview. When Anglo-Irish went into trouble, 
the rescue of this bank cost 40 points of GDP of debt for Ireland: overnight! One bank! It 
was not a problem for the Irish citizens, from the democratic accountability point of view, 
because there was an Irish supervision, an Irish mistake and an Irish checkbook. 
Now imagine that mistakes at the European level lead to the failure of a bank of the 
magnitude of Anglo-Irish. Now we have the European Resolution Fund to address it, but 
you would still have problems felt at a national level even if the cost of the recapitalization 
of banks is not only kept nationally. So we need to boost the accountability framework 
because, whether we like it or not, the citizens do not fully recognize themselves in the EP. 
That is, we have a lively and democratic space at national level, and at European level we 
very much have a procedural democracy. On paper, the system is fully democratic-
everywhere!  
Take my country for instance, I am French, the citizens elect the president, the president 
appoints the government, the government can be overthrown by the parliament etc. Every 
state appoint some kind of government, the Commission can be overthrown by the EP, 
which is elected by the citizens. So on paper it is very much the same- except that people 
feel as a French citizen, what is missing is the European citizen. The European space of 
discussion. 
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As long as the EP has not established itself as credible and representative of all European 
citizen and as a true watcher of European democracy, an accountability only to the EP, for 
the Commission as fiscal authority and the ECB as supervisor, does not produce the effect 
of accountability that would exist in the national parliament. There is a big risk to leave the 
citizen on the side line, making the citizen even more hostile towards the EU than he 
already is. 
There is no easy solution. Some are saying that we need some kind of sovereign chamber 
alongside the EP which would gather representation of the national parliament. This is a 
funny idea if you see that historically, that is what the European Parliament used to be 
before we transformed it and creating the system in which it is elected directly by citizens.  
Clearly we are struggling with this idea how best to associate national parliament. We have 
tried now with a set of legislations to give them the opportunity to contribute. During this 
crisis we have seen some national parliament taking it to the extreme. We have seen 
national parliament becoming far too powerful, work has been blocked for four months 
because there was a parliamentary recess in Finland. How can you work with this kind of 
thing? In the Eurozone area we have 18.  
On the other extreme, it was 2012 or 2011 the draft budget of Ireland landed in the 
Bundestag before reaching the Irish parliament. This is completely outrageous. 
We have to struggle to find a role for the EP with accountability framework, so that people 
don’t have that they give all these powers to Brussels and Frankfurt and then have to worry 
about it. This is particularly difficult for the ECB, as the ECB has zero accountability 
conscience. They have a strong-ivory tower, which is basically “we can say whatever we 
want to the rest of the world, but no one in the world is allowed to make the slightest 
comment on what we do”. It can’t work like this, clearly! 
That can work and is acceptable for monetary policy as was written in the Treaty but this is 
no longer monetary policy.   
Louise Mansson: Yes, it will be very interesting to see how this will work in reality. Do 
you think that generally the fact that some countries (Eurozone) will adopt it now, and 
other countries will only adopt it once they have changed currency, could create a distance 
between these countries? 
Benjamin Angel: We may have countries joining the banking union without joining the 
euro. There is an expectation that Denmark will join. 
Louise Mansson: That Denmark will join? 
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Benjamin Angel: Yes they have all kinds political significance and while they are not 
about to join the Euro, they are considering joining the SSM. Not that the elites do not 
want to, but all the elites in the national central banks and in the finance ministry are pro 
Euro but they have always failed to complete the necessary steps. Then the situation is 
really absurd, it is far worse than the situation in your country [Swedish] because they are 
in the ERM two. They get the worst of both worlds. They have no autonomy over the 
monetary policy whatsoever, the only thing they can do is to align themselves on whatever 
is decided by the ECB without ever being able to influence the ECB because they are not 
in the board.  
From a loss of sovereignty point of view, the thing that the Danish citizens were afraid of, 
is reality: they are in the worse possible situation. If you want full autonomy you stay 
outside and outside of the ERM, in the ERM and not joining the Euro then you have no 
advantage whatsoever. But so far the Danish political parties have not managed to explain 
it is convincing terms to their citizens. So banking union apparently is less controversial 
than a common currency- so they would actually like to join. 
So for the other countries, some of them want to follow. If you only have branches of 
foreign banks they won’t do anything, so it doesn’t cost anything to join the banking union. 
You can gain influence, visibility and an in-depth understanding of the system and you can 
show to the outside world that “Hey, we are supervised by the ECB” which adds on 
credibility.  
Louise Mansson: Clearly this is an aspect where communication is key. There seems to be 
a communication problem that exists in some Member States. Is this something that should 
be worked on? Highlight such issues on European level?  
Benjamin Angel: Well Sweden has been playing with the Treaty for years.  
Louise Mansson: Sweden does have an interesting position. While Denmark and the UK 
have special opt-out clauses, Sweden … 
Benjamin Angel: But there is a nasty criteria which you can use in practice: “not opting-
in”. This is the ERM criteria. While Sweden is obliged to adopt the euro under the 
Maastricht criteria, they maintain that joining the ERM is voluntary, thus enabling Sweden 
a de facto opt-out. It is a strong movement. No one can be forced to join the ERM and as 
long as Sweden doesn’t join the ERM it can never be in a position, where it respects the 
Maastricht criteria and is forced by the Treaty to join. This is what your country has done. 
Just stay out of it and you can forever stay out of the euro even when you are legally 
committed to join it.   
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Louise Mansson: According to the Financial Stability Review November 2013 published 
by the ECB, a catalogue has been established, which summarizes as aspects which will be 
supervised by the SSM. How have these aspects been identified and incorporated? 
Benjamin Angel: This was the result of a negotiation between the ECB and the national 
supervisors. Even when the ECB is in charge it doesn’t mean that the national supervisors 
are expelled. What it means is that the ECB conducts joint supervisory teams (JSTs) 
heading the supervision. But you still have national supervisory teams which makes sense! 
Don not misunderstand me, in many countries you may encounter even linguistic 
problems. Not every banker is fluent in English.  
Louise Mansson: In this regard, I also think that, the JSTs with its team from the ECB and 
the NCB or national supervisor, i.e. people from the nation state and from other countries. 
How do you think neutrality will be handled?  
Benjamin Angel: To avoid “you-scratch-my-back-I-scratch-yours” behavior? That is for 
the ECB to pay attention to when creating the teams. Obviously if you send a Greek to 
Cyrpus, or a Cypriote to Greece, or an Italian to France, and a French to Italy it will not 
help. But if you send a Greek to Germany or a German to Greece, no doubt! Perhaps they 
may even naturally be extremely biting. Of course I am joking but you need to balance the 
background to avoid possible collusion.  
Louise Mansson: Do you also think that, perhaps it has been incorporated as I have not yet 
seen the Framework, that there needs to be set a specific time-period for the operations of 
the teams abroad? In order for them to stay long enough to understand the functioning 
abroad, but not so long as to be influenced and identify too much with the system? 
Benjamin Angel: That is a problem which all supervisors have and it is not specific to the 
ECB. Even national supervisors are asked to find a right balance between building their 
expertise and to not reach a point where they are captured by the people and the banks that 
they have inspected and investigated for a number of years. The ECB has no experience in 
supervision so they will have to build their supervision first.  
Louise Mansson: Yes, they are currently doing mass recruitment. 
Benjamin Angel: 800 people. They currently have recruited 800 people and are searching 
for, I believe 1000. It is extremely difficult to find that many people who are competent, 
fluent in English and willing to live in Frankfurt which is considered at least by the 
Southern countries to be the worst possible city to live it. Rightly or wrongly- this is the 
image. 
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The ECB tried to use the stick it had, that is offer high wages compared with the rest of the 
EU institution. They had no choice, I do not blame them! It is impossible to recruit so 
many people so quickly if you do not have a big account. No other institution or 
organization from the private sector can compete with this.  
Louise Mansson: Would this not create a discrepancy between the new employees and the 
former employees?  
Benjamin Angel: Yes this creates such problems. It also creates the risk that some national 
sovereignties end up with the left overs of the ECB. This is not ideal either! It means that 
the quality of the national supervisors will deteriorate. It is a problem which we are faced 
with all over Europe and all over the institutions.  
Particularly through the enlargement to the new Member States in 2004 this problem has 
prevailed. Not only because the wages are not comparable but in 2004, when we had the 
first enlargement process, we saw even ministers applying for junior administrative 
positions. We were offering wages which sometimes represented 13-15 times the average 
wage. 13 to 15 times!  
Louise Mansson: There is no way to compete with that! 
Benjamin Angel: Exactly! If you were in the Baltic state, the normal wage for people at 
that time was 250€ per month. So if you get a wage offer which multiplies this by 12 or 15 
people accept and then they come to Brussels and realize that they are not rich with this 
salary because the cost of living is very different etc. But it draws many good people from 
those countries those people who did not get the jobs are frustrated … 
Louise Mansson: So do you think it is “too much to fast”? 
Benjamin Angel: It is a necessary step! It is a lot and not a lot! Having to recruit 1000 
people within a year was almost mission impossible. It is spectacular what they managed 
to do. At the same time if you compare it with the staff working at other institutions this is 
peanuts. So it remains very much understaffed. You should not underestimate the 
complexity of large banks.  
A bank such as BNP Paribas for instance if you are a lawyer it can have more than 7,000 
legal structures within the bank.  
Louise Mansson: This is why I think it is fascinating to make a handbook or manual 
attempting to incorporate all the banking structures when in Germany alone you have 
2,000 different banks.  
Benjamin Angel: Yes and the book was made very quickly. Their single supervisory book 
which is supposed to be much more successful than the EBA. The EBA has been working 
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on similar stuff for years but with less capacity than the ECB has. It makes a difference 
when you can peak around the table and have the last word. Which the ECB has today! 
The true number of recruitments is much higher than 1,000. You also have the all the 
external people, you have all the people that work for the NCB/ECB, national supervisors, 
legal services and all the people that will participate at the JSTs. So the true number is 
much bigger. It was not easy to get the people and it is not easy to start the machinery. But 
it is a very important step.  
Louise Mansson: Are you satisfied with the results despite the fact that the Commission 
initially did not want the ECB to head the supervision? 
Benjamin Angel: Yes we would have preferred an agency but the setup is good, the way it 
is now. A political decision was taken at the highest level, for the ECB to be in charge and 
the result is quite good.  
The only problem now is really bringing the ECB to a more cooperative culture. It is not a 
cooperative culture and this is ultimately transforming the EBA to an empty chair. They 
are misbehaving. As long as you have topics which are discussed with the EBA and then 
after months you get a message from the ECB saying, I know that we have agreed this but 
we will be doing something else. Well they can do it because they are powerful but it is not 
nice.  
It materializes the fears of the Brits for the none-Eurozone. For the non-EU, all the 
structures become satellites to the ECB. We have a good solution for it! Just join the Euro 
but I am not sure that they will.   
Louise Mansson: No they will probably prefer to watch from afar. Do you think it is 
possible for the EU to continue if the UK always opts-out of different matters? This creates 
political tensions doesn’t it? 
Benjamin Angel: They have placed big efforts on putting themselves in the corner and they 
have been successful. Now they are in the corner, unless there is unanimity nobody 
actually cares what they have to say. So they have lost any influence any influence on the 
system if there is not unanimity. 
Now they have the mixed feelings. They don’t want to be in the system but they want to 
influence the system at the same time. It cannot work this way! You can influence the 
system if you play the game but if you don’t play the game you cannot influence the 
system. This is the British situation and the more this continuous the more they feel useless 
in the system etc. So it is a self-fulfilling prophecy! Then you have crazy ideas such as 
holding a referendum… In fact we have not seen a pro EU government since the 70s. 
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Initially they were smarter in realizing that it is better to influence something from the 
inside than from the outside, which is what they did. In terms of the internal market I do 
not think we could or would have built it the way we did, if it wasn’t for the UK. Both the 
French and the German are very interventionist. So there have been positive aspects but the 
question is, what do they bring now? 
Louise Mansson: This leads us to the question which I have on European society. Do you 
think that the banking union is a natural step in the EU integration process and that it is 
necessary to “lay the foundations for an ever closer union of the people in Europe”? 
Benjamin Angel: For people like me this is a huge step. But the average citizen doesn’t 
care at all about supervision. So if I want to be lucid it is a super important step for the 
happy few.  
Louise Mansson: Even if they don’t care, the closer union of the people is perhaps not 
something that the citizens are aware of on a daily basis. For example… 
Benjamin Angel: You mean is it visible? The Euro for example is very visible you open up 
your pocket, you open up the border and you start crossing the border without a passport… 
everyone notices it! But banking supervision… Even the heads of state did not necessarily 
know what they were doing. For them or the majority of them it was something about a 
technical decision, sending someone to do technical things, doing some boring stuff. They 
had no idea of how important the step was. 
That is how it is done. All that big progress is always top-down. You never, never, never 
get it from the man. If you put the experts in a room, finance ministry and the central bank 
each of them will find 200 reasons arguing that it will not work. Very often these are good 
arguments!  
Whilst when you have a decision which is taken, people are no longer focus on listing or 
addressing the problems which gives a completely different twist to the situation.  
Louise Mansson: It is often accentuated, that the banking supervision aims to break the 
close bond between states and banks; what impact would this have on the society in 
general? 
Benjamin Angel: In a normal situation none. In an extreme situation when we have seen a 
bank collapse making the whole economy and financial system collapse, the fact that we 
will have a common resolution fund there will be a common burden sharing, thus it will 
avoid burdening the financial system. 
For the average German and French it will have no impact at all. Though the citizens of 
Ireland would have been very happy to have it a few years ago as it would not have such a 
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big mess as they have today. But the average citizen does not care about the banks and 
does not know if something is fishy with a bank. 
For instance in Cyprus the banks were serving completely crazy rates on deposits. Normal 
rates are 6-7%, on normal deposits! If you tell this to a German or French they will say 
there is something fishy. But for the Cypriots all the banks were doing it! And if you live 
there and all the banks do it, then for the average citizen there is nothing wrong. It is what 
you have always been used to and you do not question it.  
Louise Mansson: Some say that the states are in the iron hand of the banks. What do you 
think will be the effects on this relationship? 
Benjamin Angel: The banks do not dominate the states. The states are at risk when volatile 
banks because it puts the states in bigger trouble. This is because of systemic risk. Banking 
remains far different from any other activity. If you manufacture computers and your 
largest competitor collapses this is great news for you, but if you are a bank and your main 
competitor collapses you are in the risk of collapsing next. 
So it is a completely different area and one which is difficult to explain to the citizens. 
There is a big citizen fatigue towards rescuing the banks. The EU system howe.er remains 
very bank intermediated. For instance, if you compare it to the US, 2/3 of credit in the EU 
comes from the banks and 1/3 from other sources. In the US it is the opposite. So if the 
banks in Europe fall, the whole economic activity falls. So you do not create market 
financing overnight. 
One effect of the crisis, paradoxically, it has made the big banks bigger. So the too-big-too-
fail has become common. When we mention too-big-too-fail people often think of small 
country big bank, but it does well beyond that. Even big-country-big-bank, the country 
cannot always afford it. 
BNP Paribas alone, one bank, represents 120% of the French GDP. So not even France 
could rescue it, it is just too big! When you have monsters like this you do not have a 
choice!  
Louise Mansson: In a scientific I read that the French banks escaped nationalization which 
led to questions about the state of power of French banks over the state. That public 
accountability and responsibility was not necessarily with the state. 
Benjamin Angel: That is a very strange point of view. First the French banks have gone 
through the crisis relatively well, if you compare it with Germany and the UK there was 
not a single bank failure in France. Why? Why France did not suffer to much or why 
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nationalization should have been warranted, incidentally the whole system of French banks 
was nationalized in 1981 which was a big mistake.  
I am not a fan of nationalization and you will not find many friends of nationalization 
within this institution. While being pragmatic in some extreme circumstances is it the right 
thing to do. Sometimes it is the necessary to do, but the state is not a better manager of 
than the private sector. The superior capacity of the state, and that was the argument, of 
your minister Borg is that it has a capacity to sit longer on the assets so if it rescues the 
bank it can wait long enough to settle for a profit. 
Louise Mansson: Why would you consider that the French banks were so successful during 
the crisis? 
Benjamin Angel: Yes they had exposure to Greece for example. But a) even this big 
exposure was only a small percentage of the total exposure; b) they were strong and large 
universal banks and when the crisis started on the investment part and moved to retail, but 
it never hit both at the same time; c) they are much diversified.  
They are comparable to the rest of the EU but there is much more leverage. So in this 
respect that is the reason why people see them as more risky. There is always a suspicion 
towards the system but they went through the crisis very well, so there must be a reason for 
this. 
Louise Mansson: Just as the European Society is made up of an array of cultures and 
traditions, so are the European banks. In how far have these cultural differences been 
considered in the construction of a European Banking Supervision? 
Benjamin Angel: If there is one thing that should be learned from the crisis is that we 
should not be too receptive of this kind of argument. We have heard this argument used 
time and again at national level. There is one country were we heard “we have plenty of 
savings banks and we want these banks to have a very simple model. Not to enter into 
complex products and speculation that we don’t understand but rather stick to the market 
that we know best.” This sounds good, it sounds sound. But the only thing that they could 
finance locally was housing and commercial property… 
Louise Mansson: Spain? 
Benjamin Angel: Exactly. That is how the saving bank sector fell down. Complete 
collapse! You see sometimes you have good intentions and reality is very different from 
the intentions. So for all those local pacifists… well I do not have much sympathy for it.  
Louise Mansson: This was my last question but do you think there is anything else I should 
know or be aware of? 
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Benjamin Angel: I think we have covered a lot but if you have any further questions you 
can write me an email.  
Louise Mansson: Thank you very much for your time. It has been very helpful! 
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Appendix II. 
Articles published by the Financial Times on the Topic of SSM July 2012-July 2014 
Title Date 
Europe's banking union faces legal challenge in Germany Jul 27, 2014 
Bulgaria turns to ECB to stave off banking crisis Jul 18, 2014 
Potential for crisis aftershocks at eastern European banks Jul 16, 2014 
EU to rate lenders in effort for regulatory unity Jul 8, 2014 
Historic Monte Paschi looks to a future beyond ist tribulations Jun 8, 2014 
Bank of England urges revival of business register to ease SME 
lending crisis May 30, 2014 
Eurozone officials pin their hopes on a new regulatory toolkit May 18, 2014 
ECB needs to get house in order Apr 17, 2014 
Gentrification sparks divisions in Frankfurt's old districts Apr 17, 2014 
Protect Britain's interests in a two-speed Europe Mar 27, 2014 
Get your finances in order and stop blaming Germany Mar 25, 2014 
A highly imperfect banking union Mar 23, 2014 
Germany's property rush is based on concrete gold Mar 23, 2014 
City of London urges 'muscular' defence against EU regulation Mar 18, 2014 
Europe should say no to a flawed banking union Mar 16, 2014 
Barclays breach, warning for weak banks, and China's squeeze goes 
overseas Feb 10, 2014 
Transcript of interview with Danièle Nouy Feb 9, 2014 
Eurozone's new super-regulator prepares to be unpopular Feb 9, 2014 
Let weak banks die, says eurzone super-regulator Feb 9, 2014 
ECB vice-president defends strength of ist health check on banks Feb 3, 2014 
UK opposes Mario Draghi role at watchdog Jan 27, 2014 
ECB fails to attract enough female applicants to fill own quota Dec 19, 2013 
The European Banking Union is a disappointment Dec 19, 2013 
Rules for failing banks raise prospect of eurozone red-tape burden Dec 15, 2013 
ECB official Asmussen quits to serve in German coalition Dec 15, 2013 
A weak EU banking union risks deflation Dec 9, 2013 
ECB warns on external risks to eurozone financial system Nov 27, 2013 
ECB review must have sharp teeth Oct 23, 2013 
The year of assessing comprehensively Oct 23, 2013 
UK demands hold up European banking union  Oct 11, 2013 
It is time to shore up Europe's banks Oct 6, 2013 
Live blog: Draghi on ECB monetary policy Oct 2, 2013 
Europe's banks undervalued, says ECB deputy Vítor Constancio Oct 1, 2013 
Draghi can save the euro again- but not alone Sep 20, 2013 
ECB pledges to promote more women to senior roles Aug 29, 2013 
Eurozone is heading for relapse back into crisis Aug 28, 2013 
Litany of ifs and buts hang over Europe's banking rehabilitation Aug 26, 2013 
Merkel's deutsche Michel' ploy is bad economics Jul 11, 2013 
Introducing the SRM, mangled at birth Jul 10, 2013 
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Markets Insight: Bail-in regime risks old-style bank runs Jul 3, 2013 
Bail-in fears grow for big depositors in euro periphery Jul 1, 2013 
ECB exit from easing remains far off, Draghi says Jun 26, 2013 
ECB backs away from use of 'big bazooka' to boost credit Jun 3, 2013 
Merkel party allies accuse Hollande of shaking EU's foundations May 30, 2013 
Banking union's house of twigs (with cut out and keept optionality) May 30, 2013 
Europe must make up for time-wasting May 19, 2013 
The 6am Cut London May 17, 2013 
Stress you next year May 16, 2013 
NPLs and lights in dark places May 13, 2013 
Banking union must be built on firm foundations May 12, 2013 
Opinion: Hurdles remain high for banking union May 9, 2013 
Markets Insight: Eurozone crisis demands swift debt restructuring May 8, 2013 
Europe's ills cannot be healed by monetary innovation alone Apr 24, 2013 
NY Fed warns on 'go it alone' regulators Apr 22, 2013 
A German path for the eurozone Apr 21, 2013 
Europe's banks need to be recapizalised-now Apr 15, 2013 
ECB draws bail-in lessons from Cyprus Apr 4, 2013 
EU agrees on ECB bank regulatory role Mar 19, 2013 
Bonus issue marks start of a long battle Mar 3, 2013 
Bank reform is gathering pace Feb 25, 2013 
Zombie banks must not derail recovery Feb 20, 2013 
IMF urges speed on EU banking union Feb 13, 2013 
A misunderstanding of the banking union initiative Feb 3, 2013 
Brussels is making progress on banks Jan 16, 2013 
Juncker pleads for banking integration Jan 10, 2013 
Slow but real progress on resolving eurozone crisis Dec 17, 2012 
Politics undermines hope of banking union Dec 16, 2012 
European Council summits Brussels Day Two Dec 14, 2012 
FT Person of the Year: Mario Draghi Dec 13, 2012 
Draghi's rallying cry for new EU powers Dec 13, 2012 
Europe delivers on banking union Dec 13, 2012 
The stricks and carrots of a banking union Dec 13, 2012 
Debate rages on Eurozone banks supervisor Dec 9, 2012 
One regulator for all banks says Draghi Dec 6, 2012 
ECB cuts eurozone growth forecasts Dec 6, 2012 
Banking union Dec 5, 2012 
Europe Needs to embrance banking union Nov 14, 2012 
Banking union will not end Europe's crisis Oct 21, 2012 
EU bank supervisor- unfinished business Oct 21, 2012 
Rajoy takes long view over summit outcome Oct 19, 2012 
Were Hollande and Merkel at the same summit? Oct 19, 2012 
EU summit: What, exactly, was agreed Friday? Oct 19, 2012 
Clock is ticking on a European banking union Oct 19, 2012 
Only big debt restructuring can save euro Oct 15, 2012 
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Live blog: Draghi presser Oct 4, 2012 
Poland: Rostiwski interview transcript Oct 3, 2012 
Buiter on good news, bad news Sep 24, 2012 
A five-step guide to European banking union Sep 17, 2012 
Consider the requirements of each nation Sep 17, 2012 
Dutch vote gives Europe extra time Sep 13, 2012 
ECB delves into messy world of supervision Sep 12, 2012 
Let's not be afraid of… banking union Sep 12, 2012 
Berlin pressed on banking union plan Sep 10, 2012 
Brussels urged not to raise hopes on eurozone Sep 7, 2012 
Ireland's similar case for banking treatment Sep 5, 2012 
EBA chief plots path to banking union Jul 15, 2012 
Spain brimming with Eurogroup win? Jul 10, 2012 
Eurozone draws up Spanish aid blueprint Jul 10, 2012 
Eurogroup statement  Jul 10, 2012 
Details on Spanish bailout still unclear Jul 9, 2012 
 
Articles published by Reuters on the Topic of SSM July 2012-July 2014 
Title Date 
Will Europe's banking "big bang" loosen lending? Aug 4, 2014 
Bulgaria starts talks about European supervision of ist banks Jul 15, 2014 
Bulgaria central bank starts talks about European supervision Jul 15, 2014 
Bulgarian parties agree to join banking supervisory mechanism July 14, 2014 
Bulgaria asks ECB to supervise ist banks July 14, 2014 
ECB watchdog says bank safety checks running according to plan July 9, 2014 
ECB extends one bank test deadline but overall timetable holds Jun 25, 2014 
ECB bank watchdog says markets favorable for capital raising Jun 23, 2014 
ECB will link up with bank watchdog to monitor stability Jun 23, 2014 
ECB banking watchdog says it is well on track to achieve goals Jun 23, 2014 
ECB's supervision head says banks in better shape than markets Jun 11, 2014 
Europe's new banking watchdog wants harmonized reporting 
template Jun 5, 2014 
Europe's banks don't add to economic growth, academics say Jun 2, 2014 
ECB goes on 300 mln euro spending spree for bank watchdog May 27, 2014 
ECB considering holding less frequent policy meetings- sources May 20, 2014 
ECB's Coeure: new supervisory set-up may induce bank restructures May 19, 2014 
Fitch Affirms Five Large Italian Banks May 13, 2014 
Excessive bank capital demands take equity away from SMEs Apr 30, 2014 
RPT-Fitch: EU Bank Stress Test tough enough but only the first Apr 30, 2014 
ECB finalizes legal framework for banking supervision Apr 25, 2014 
Fitch Affirms SRFs of 64 EMEA Banks; Downward Revisions 
Likely Mar 26, 2014 
Fitch Revises Outlooks for 18 EU State-sponsored Banks to 
Negative Mar 26, 2014 
ECB sends former board Member Hamalainen to new banking Mar 7, 2014 
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watchdog 
RPT-Bankers' expertise needed to sharpen new bank watchdog's 
teeth Mar 3, 2014 
Update 1-ECBs Lautenschlaeger: European banking needs one Feb 28, 2014 
Lautenschlaeger: ECB will not let banks failing tests off the hook Feb 28, 2014 
New euro zone bank watchdog won't change accounting standards Feb 19, 2014 
EU ministers to conisder faster sharing of bank closure costs Feb 18, 2014 
Eurozone watchdog says some banks should go under Feb 10, 2014 
Press Digest- Financial Times- Feb 10 Feb 9, 2014 
ECB in driving seat in new eurozone bank supervision draft Feb 7, 2014 
ECB to gain far-reaching powers as euro zone bank's supervisor Feb 7, 2014 
Fitch: EU Bank Stress Test Raises Hurdle, but lacks key details Feb 5, 2014 
Coeure gets key portfolios in ECB board reshuffle Feb 4, 2014 
ECB's Lautenschlaeger calls for swift agreement on Jan 31, 2014 
SRM should include all euro zone banks- ECB's Lautenschaleger Jan 31, 2014 
ECB proposes Lautenschlaeger for vice chair of banking watchdog Jan 22, 2014 
Eurozone set for drawn-out battle over banking rules Dec 17, 2014 
Germany proposes Bundesbank deputy for ECB Board Seat Dec 17, 2013 
Banking Union: nice idea but detail still devilish Dec 16, 2013 
ECB says Nouy appointed as head of banking supervisor Dec 16, 2013 
Single supervison to boost bank mergers- Constancio Dec 2, 2013 
Constancio expects single supervison to lead to bank mergers Dec 2, 2013 
Madame Nouy set to take on Europe's banks Nov 27, 2013 
ECB nominates France's Nouy to chair banks supervisor Nov 20, 2013 
ECB gives banks temporary reprieve in health check data haul Nov 18, 2013 
ECBs Mersch pushes for 2015 start for bank resolution mechanism Nov 15, 2013 
EU ministers agree euro zone bailout fund can be used as ultimate Nov 15, 2013 
EU banks outside euro zone likely to overcome stress test divide Nov 12, 2013 
EU leaders to set tight timetable on completing banking union Oct 24, 2013 
Euro zone banks to clean house ahead of ECB review Oct 24, 2013 
770 ECB banking supervisors within a year Oct 23, 2013 
Draghi wants European banks backstop in place by 2015 Oct 23, 2013 
Western banks still in retreat from Central Europe Oct 23, 2013 
ECB sets out tougher bank health tests, shares drop Oct 23, 2013 
ECB eyes tough terms for bank balance sheet check-paper Oct 14, 2013 
Proposed agency to close failing EU banks would violate treaties Oct 7, 2013 
The road ahead for Europe's new banking watchdog Sep 27, 2013 
ECB bank assessment may expose capital gaps- Mersch Sep 26, 2013 
Austria's Fekter backs Schaeuble on banking union Sep 17, 2013 
Europe clears critical hurdle on road to banking union Sep 12, 2013 
ECBs Asmussen- bank supervision timetable doable Sep 4, 2013 
Asmussen wants ECB to decide alone which banks not viable Sep 4, 2013 
RPT-Fitch: Italian Banks to Step up Corporate Governance Changes Sep 3, 2013 
ECBs Mersch says timetable for new bank watchdog challenging Aug 29, 2013 
RPT-Fitch: Investors say banking union will not reduce default Aug 8, 2013 
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ECB to complete bank health check-up in Feb Aug 1, 2013 
RPT-Fitch: Italian Mid-sized banks likely to raise fresh equity Jul 30, 2013 
RPT-Fitch: Single bank resolution fund positive for sovereign Jul 12, 2013 
European regulator preparing database on bankers Jul 7, 2013 
EU leaders push banking union despite German reluctance Jun 28, 2013 
ECB is ready to act but governments must reform, says Draghi Jun 26, 2013 
Draghi says ECB policy exit distant, ready to act Jun 26, 2013 
Pessimism surrounds EU bank union prospects Jun 26, 2013 
ECB still long way for exiting easy policy: Coeure Jun 25, 2013 
Irish bankers joke over bailout at EU's expense Jun 25, 2013 
Euro zone lenders count cost of EU bank impasse Jun 24, 2013 
Big economic policy decisions nont on hold: Eus Barroso Jun 20, 2013 
Euro zone single supervision launch may face three-month delay Jun 18, 2013 
ECBs Asmussen says EBA stress test in Q2 next year Jun 14, 2013 
ECB to avoid further crisis, ensure bank scrutiny: policymakers Jun 10, 2013 
Draghi urges swift implementation of bank resolution mechanism Jun 6, 2013 
ECBs Draghi says banks' single supervisory mechanism to take Jun 2, 2013 
ECB Focus-Single bank watchdog becomes mammoth project for 
ECB May 26, 2013 
ECB's Mersch says asset quality review could start in Q3 May 17, 2013 
ECB's Asmussen wants single bank supervision, resolution next year May 14, 2013 
ECB's Asmussen wants single bank supervision and resolution 
scheme May 14, 2013 
Divisions hamper Europe's plans to tackle failing banks May 14, 2013 
Highlights: Draghi comments at ECB news conference May 2, 2013 
Decision on euro zone bank review within 2 months-Buba Apr 30, 2013 
ECB: Financial markets remain fragile, banking union needed Apr 25, 2013 
Growth to return only slowly in second half- EU's Rehn Apr 22, 2013 
Most EU bank union work can be done without law change: 
Eurogroup Apr 20, 2013 
G20 urges EU to complete banking union fast, Germany digs in 
heels Apr 19, 2013 
ECBs Asmussen urges govts to press ahead with banking union Apr 19, 2013 
Draghi urges governments to solve debt crisis, says ECB cannot Apr 15, 2013 
ECBs Mersch warns of possible supervisory delay Apr 5, 2013 
What next after Cyprus bailout? Mar 26, 2013 
RPT-Fitch; Cyprus stalemate shows dangers of ad hoc crisis Mar 21, 2013 
ESM should be temporary backstop for bank resolution- ECBs Knot Mar 19, 2013 
Bank Supervisor could move outside ECB eventually-Knot Mar 19, 2013 
Cyprus overshadows banking union as ECB prepares for watchdog 
role Mar 18, 2013 
ECB wins watchdog role under cloud over Cyprus deposit levy Mar 19, 2013 
Cheap money not getting through to those who need it Mar 11, 2013 
Sound bank union will help transmit ECB policy: Mersch Feb 27, 2013 
Nordea CEO Clausen sees more uniform banking rules Feb 12, 2013 
ECB mon. Policy to benefit from supervisory tasks-Coeure Feb 7, 2013 
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Fitch assigns Societe de Financement Local 'AA+', outlook Feb 1, 2013 
Draghi comments at ECB news conference Jan 10, 2013 
IMF says no room for delay on EU financial sector reforms Dec 20, 2012 
Asmussen opposes ECB bond buys if conditions not met Dec 19, 2012 
Insight: Marathon talks set Europe on path to banking union Dec 18, 2012 
Euro zone rescuer Draghi faces daunting 2013 Dec 18, 2012 
Mersch, Constancio to lead ECB bank union work Dec 18, 2012 
Draghi: ECB bank oversicht will revive confidence, lending Dec 17, 2012 
ECBs Constancio: several non-euro states to join SSM Dec 17, 2012 
Comments after EU leaders' summit Dec 14, 2012 
Fitch: Europe's SSM deal positive, broader EMU reform Dec 14, 2012 
ECB warns against complacency on crisis, says risks remain Dec 14, 2012 
Fitch affirms France at 'AAA'; outlook negative Dec 14, 2012 
UK lawmakers fear impact of EU banking union plan Dec 11, 2012 
EU wants summit backing for banking union Dec 10, 2012 
German finmin signals ready to compromise on banking union Dec 9, 2012 
EU sets out detailed "map" for euro zone's overhaul Dec 6, 2012 
Van Rompuy charts path to closer integration Dec 6, 2012 
EU's Regling: Moody's did not account enough for ESM paid-in Dec 3, 2012 
Comments from euro zone finance ministers, officals Dec 3, 2012 
EU's Juncker: disbursement for Spanish banks middle of next week Dec 3, 2012 
ECB ready for bond purchases if conditions met: Coeure Nov 28, 2012 
Europe's insurers may get single supervisor-industry body Nov 20, 2012 
ECB and Bundesbank at odds over bank supervision clout Nov 19, 2012 
ECB's Coeure says all banks should be covered by new supervision Nov 19, 2012 
ECB's Praet- bank union a necessity for euro zone Nov 19, 2012 
Fitch: European investors believe in banking union Nov 12, 2012 
Draghi comments at ECB news conference Nov 8, 2012 
Germany seeks to limit ECB role in banking union Nov 7, 2012 
Open full European banking union to emerging Europe, EBRD says Nov 7, 2012 
Main points of G20 communique Nov 5, 2012 
EU to mull plan to bring non-euro states into bank union Oct 23, 2012 
Comments from EU leaders' summit Oct 18, 2012 
Europe advances towards single banking supervisor Oct 18, 2012 
Europe pushes ahead towards ECB bank supervision Oct 19, 2012 
Fitch: slow progress at EU summit builds pressure on Dec Oct 19, 2012 
Germans hail Merkel "winner on points" at EU summit Oct 19, 2012 
EU leaders leave critical issues on banking union unanswered Oct 19, 2012 
Merkel raises new hurdles on EU bank union Oct 19, 2012 
Merkel says EU bank watchdog will take time to set up Oct 19, 2012 
Comments before EU leaders' summit Oct 18, 2012 
EU Commission dismisses problems with ECB oversight Oct 18, 2012 
EU seeks way to involve non-euro states in banking union Oct 18, 2012 
Global Markets- Shares set for weekly losses as growth concerns Oct 18, 2012 
Italy's Monti says ESM should aid banks directly Oct 11, 2012 
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IMF Global Financial Stability Report Oct 9, 2012 
EBA regulators airs euro zone bank union concerns Oct 10, 2012 
Tax on trading threatens new division in Europe Oct 10, 2012 
ECB's Coeure says banking union a "game-changer" Oct 8, 2012 
Euro zone finance ministers meet to discuss Spain, Greece Oct 8, 2012 
Eurogroup comments on Spain, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus Oct 8, 2012 
Britan warns against dominant ECB in banking union Oct 3, 2012 
Germany says banking union won't happen by start of 2013 Oct 1, 2012 
European lawmakers warn of banking union split Sep 26, 2012 
Euro zone split over how to interpret bank debt deal Sep 26, 2012 
ECB's Demetriades says banking union feasible, urgent Sep 25, 2012 
Fitch: Progress made on eurozone policy response, risks remain Sep 20, 2012 
Regulator warns banking union could split Europe Sep 19, 2012 
RPT-Barroso tells Germans their savings safe in an EU bank reform Sep 16, 2012 
Fitch: Banking union will make bank resolution more objective Sep 13, 2012 
EU's Barroso: ECB should oversee all banks in banking union Sep 12, 2012 
Commission and Berlin differ over ECB bank supervision Sep 3, 2012 
ECB to oversee all euro zone banks: report Aug 30, 2012 
Spain inches towards a full EU bailout Aug 3, 2012 
ESRB advisory committee queries Spanish banks plan Jul 31, 2012 
Euro zone banking union proposal seen in September: Barroso Jul 26, 2012 
Spain, France want single bank mechanism by end-2012 Jul 25, 2012 
Forex- Euro higher on ESM comments but unterlying weakness seen Jul 25, 2012 
Euro rises from 2-year low, but gains expected to fade Jul 25, 2012 
Forex- Euro rises vs dollar but gains may prove short-lived Jul 25, 2012 
Global Markets- Euro rises on ECB talk of stemming debt crisis Jul 25, 2012 
Gold up nearly 2 percent on stimulur hopes for US, Europe Jul 25, 2012 
Euro rises on ECB talk, earnings buoy Dow Jul 25, 2012 
Fitch affirms Italy at 'A-', outlook negative Jul 19, 2012 
German lower house to pass Spanish aid despite Merkel revolt Jul 18, 2012 
EU finance ministers' meeting Jul 10, 2012 
Euro zone finance ministers' meeting Jul 9, 2012 
Euro zone can help banks directly once supervisor set up Jul 9, 2012 
Spain faces budget risks despite looser target: document Jul 9, 2012 
Direct ESM bank aid needs sovereign guarantee-offical Jul 6, 2012 
Fitch: banking union could support stability Jul 2, 2012 
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Appendix III.  
Listing of SSM related Publications on Websites  
Institution/ 
Euro area Member State 
Results related to Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
ECB 2230 
Commission 1635 
France 267 
Spain 197 
Austria 111 
Belgium 107 
Germany 105 
Italy 68 
Ireland 60 
Finland 54 
Netherlands 50 
Slovakia 43 
Slovenia 30 
Greece 20 
Malta 19 
Cyprus 10 
Estonia 9 
Portugal 1 
Latvia 1 
Luxembourg 0 
 
 
 
 
 
